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ABSTRACT 
Kelly Kilburn: Cash Transfers, Behavioral Change, And Child Development: Experimental Evidence 
From Malawi’s Cash Transfer Program  
(Under the direction of Sudhanshu Handa) 
 
This dissertation examines the impacts of a social cash transfer program for poverty alleviation in Malawi 
on caregiver and child outcomes and whether these impacts can be explained by changes to household 
behaviors or mindsets. The data for this study comes from a cluster-randomized study of the Government 
of Malawi’s Social Cash Transfer Program that provides unconditional cash payments to ultra-poor, 
labor-constrained households. After a baseline survey, households in the study were randomly chosen to 
the treatment group to receive transfers immediately or to the later entry control group. A follow-up 
survey was then conducted after 12 months of transfers to the treatment group. This dissertation uses this 
experimental panel data to provide causal evidence on whether Malawi’s program impacts child outcomes 
and parental behaviors. The goal of this research is to come to a greater understanding of how cash 
transfers may improve the chances of ending poverty transfers across generations. This dissertation 
consists of three essays to meet this goal: In the first essay, I show the impacts of the cash transfer 
program on adult caregiver subjective well-being. In the second and third essays I examine child 
development outcomes of schooling and mental health respectively and whether parental behaviors 
mediate the direct impact from the cash transfer.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Poverty and vulnerability are two interlinked conditions that contribute to poverty traps across 
generations. Poverty makes people vulnerable to conditions such as ill health, unemployment, and shocks 
like conflict or famine while vulnerability enhances poverty, limiting people’s ability to rise out of 
poverty (Philip & Rayhan, 2004). The severity of these conditions in the developing world means that 
families in chronic poverty suffer cumulative and enduring consequences, which is transmitted down to 
their children (Barrientos & Dejong, 2006). Children who grow up in poverty can suffer detrimental 
impacts to their health, human capital, and psychosocial well-being (Case, Paxton, & Ableidinger, 2003; 
Harper, Marcus, & Moore, 2003). These factors contribute to the persistence of poverty as children 
transition into their adult lives, reinforcing the poverty cycle as they have their own children (Barrientos 
& Dejong, 2006). 
Knowledge is needed about the ways existing policies address the widespread poverty and 
vulnerability of these children and families to find what really works to end the poverty cycle. There are a 
multitude of causal factors at play in intergenerational poverty transmission including economic, political, 
social, and environmental ones, but one of the main challenges for policy-makers is to understand how to 
effect change at the micro or individual level because individual-level behaviors strongly influence the 
cycle of intergenerational poverty (Harper et al., 2003).  
In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the vulnerability of the family has become more pronounced as 
mounting traditional drivers of poverty have interacted with the rise of the AIDS epidemic (Samson, 
2009). Weakening family systems have become less able to provide financial protection and other forms 
of support, resulting in the increase of poverty and instability, especially for children (Kaseke, 1996; 
Adato & Bassett, 2008).  
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Efforts to respond to these issues have led to promotion of social protection policies to create 
enabling environments for family unification and support. According to the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, social protection policy focuses on “uplifting the poor and vulnerable by 
enhancing their capacity to cope with poverty, equipping them to better manage risks and shocks” 
(Samson, 2009). Social cash transfers in particular, have emerged in the developing world as a lead social 
protection initiative. They support the goal of social protection by giving consistent, non-contributory 
cash payments to the most poor and vulnerable in society.  
Evidence shows that cash transfers have several mechanisms to enhance the livelihoods of the 
poor and vulnerable. First, the consistent, extra cash payment becomes a stabilizing force for the 
household, helping them to purchase essential food items and health related expenses (Handa, Devereux, 
& Webb, 2010). Second, they help to mitigate the risks of living in poverty, protecting households from 
shocks and encouraging productive investments (Samson, 2009). Third, cash transfers have a 
transformational component by supporting human capital investments in children, which can help 
households overcome intergenerational poverty (Handa et al., 2010).  
In SSA, there is a focus on unconditional cash transfers that distribute payments regardless of 
recipient behaviors as opposed to conditional transfers that tie receipt to certain conditions. Unconditional 
cash transfers are seen as an alternative way to promote behavior change because they give direct 
economic power to the poor by letting them make the decisions on how to spend the money (Handa et al., 
2010). Additionally, cash transfers in Africa are most often targeted to household units and thus have an 
important job in revitalizing the family and its system of traditional support. Families play a decisive role 
in so many aspects of individuals’ lives as they provide the daily environment where individuals eat, 
sleep, communicate, and learn social skills. Since families provide this critical environment, policies 
targeted to them can affect the micro-level behavior change that can have the biggest and most efficient 
impact on poverty alleviation (Arriagada, 2011). 
Africa has already invested heavily in social cash transfers and with plans to expand programs, 
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millions of people will eventually be reached (Samson, 2009). The growing scale of social cash transfers 
means that there is a need for comprehensive evaluations to understand the breadth and depth of impacts 
to inform policymakers and enhance literature on social protection policy. While previous evaluations 
have provided extensive positive evidence that unconditional cash transfers can improve family and child 
welfare and empower better decision-making (productivity—Covarubbias, Davis, & Winters, 2012; 
schooling—Kenya CT-OVC, 2012; Miller & Tsoka, 2012; Robertson et al., 2013; sexual behavior of 
youth—Baird, Chirwa, McIntosh, & Özler, 2010 ; Handa et al., 2014), the literature is lacking evidence 
on the processes that change behavior.  
Most evaluations of poverty alleviation programs have focused on the important work of 
predicting relationships between independent and dependent variables, essential for making claims about 
policy effectiveness. However, another important objective in social science research is to explain these 
relationships to improve our understanding of the world, and for policy analysts, to enhance policy 
design. Therefore, explaining the relationships between SCT receipt and behavior change is important to 
gain knowledge of why we observe certain impacts and will help inform better policy design and 
targeting. Moreover, understanding processes is particularly important in the case of unconditional cash 
transfers since there are no conditions to attribute changes in behavior.   
This dissertation evaluates a social cash transfer program in Malawi to understand how it affects 
family and child well-being and transforms behaviors known to keep families in poverty. The data for this 
study comes from a cluster-randomized study of the Government of Malawi’s Social Cash Transfer 
Program. Baseline survey data was collected in the summer of 2013 and then households were randomly 
assigned to either the treatment group (T) to receive transfers immediately or to the later entry control 
group (C). A follow-up survey was then conducted after 12 months of transfers in late 2014.  
The goal of this proposed research is to come to a greater understanding of how cash transfers can 
impact individual and family behavior to enhance the prospects of ending intergenerational poverty 
cycles. This dissertation consists of three essays to address this goal:  
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Essay One 
This essay analyzes the impact of Malawi’s Social Cash Transfer Program on caregivers’ 
subjective well-being using panel data from 3,365 households. Utilizing econometric analysis and panel 
data methods, we find that household income increases from the cash transfer can have substantial 
subjective well-being gains among caregivers. Households use the cash to improve their families’ 
livelihoods, ensuring provision of their basics needs including food, shelter, and clothing. Reduction of 
these daily stresses makes caregivers happy about their current situations and gives them hope that the 
future will continue to get better.  
Essay Two  
This essay analyzes the impact of Malawi’s Social Cash Transfer Program on child schooling 
outcomes including enrollment, dropouts, and withdrawals. We also examine potential intervening 
pathways that lie on the causal pathway between cash transfers and child schooling since households 
receive the cash and parents are responsible for making spending decisions. We use a differences-in-
differences specification to test treatment impacts on a two-wave panel of 6,303 school-aged children (6-
17). Findings indicate that the cash transfer program has strong schooling impacts; it improves enrollment 
rates and decreases dropouts. We also find that the main intervening pathway between the program and 
schooling is through education expenditures implying that the cash helps improve the demand for 
education by reducing financial constraints.  
Essay Three 
This study analyzes the impact of Malawi’s Social Cash Transfer Program on adolescent mental 
health. In addition, we assess potential intervening pathways that lie on the causal pathway between 
household cash transfers and adolescent mental health since parents are responsible for spending the cash 
and because there are no conditions for how to use the money. We use a two-wave panel of 3,369 
households and 1,332 adolescents. Results from our differences-in-differences model show no significant 
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effects of the cash transfer on depression for the full sample. However, for females and orphans known to 
be more at risk of depression, there is a significant reduction of depression in the treatment arm. While 
there are strong impacts from the cash transfer on potential intervening pathways, we do not find that 
these pathways explain much of the treatment effect on adolescent mental health.  
  
  
 
6
REFERENCES 
 
Adato, M., & Bassett, L. (2009). Social protection to support vulnerable children and families: the 
potential of cash transfers to protect education, health and nutrition. Aids Care, 21(S1), 60-75. 
 
Arriagada, I. (2011). Family and cash transfer programs in Latin America. In United Nations Expert 
Group meeting on assessing family policies: Confronting family poverty and social exclusion & 
ensuring work–family balance, 1-13. 
Baird, S., Chirwa, E., McIntosh, C., & Özler, B. (2010). The short‐term impacts of a schooling 
conditional cash transfer program on the sexual behavior of young women. Health economics, 
19(S1), 55-68. 
 
Barrientos, A., & DeJong, J. (2006). Reducing child poverty with cash transfers: A sure thing?. 
Development Policy Review, 24(5), 537-552. 
 
Brooks-Gunn, J., & Duncan, G. J. (1997). The effects of poverty on children. The future of children, 55-
71. 
 
Case, A., Paxson, C., & Ableidinger, J. (2004). Orphans in Africa: Parental death, poverty, and school 
enrollment. Demography, 41(3), 483-508. 
 
Covarrubias, K., Davis, B., & Winters, P. (2012). From protection to production: productive impacts of 
the Malawi social cash transfer scheme. Journal of Development Effectiveness, 4(1), 50-77. 
 
Gershoff, E. T., Aber, J. L., Raver, C. C., & Lennon, M. C. (2007). Income is not enough: Incorporating 
material hardship into models of income associations with parenting and child development. 
Child development, 78(1), 70-95. 
 
Handa, S., Devereux, S., & Webb, D. (Eds.). (2010). Social Protection for Africa s Children (Vol. 86). 
Oxford, UK: Routledge. 
 
Handa, S., Halpern, C. T., Pettifor, A., & Thirumurthy, H. (2014). The Government of Kenya's Cash 
Transfer Program Reduces the Risk of Sexual Debut among Young People Age 15-25. PloS one, 
9(1), e85473. 
 
Handa, S., Martorano, B., Thirumurthy, H., Halpern, C., & Pettifor, A. (2014). Subjective Welfare, Risk 
Perceptions and Time Discounting: Evidence from a Large Scale Cash Transfer Program. 
UNICEF, Innocenti Working Papers. 
 
Harper, C., Marcus, R., & Moore, K. (2003). Enduring poverty and the conditions of childhood: 
lifecourse and intergenerational poverty transmissions. World development, 31(3), 535-554. 
 
Kaseke, E. (1996). The International Year of the Family: Reflections from an Africa Perspective. Journal 
of Social Development in Africa, 11, 87-94. 
 
The Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation Team. (2012). The impact of Kenya's Cash Transfer for Orphans and 
Vulnerable Children on human capital. Journal of Development Effectiveness, 4(1), 38-49. 
 
  
 
7
Miller, C., & Tsoka, M. (2012). Cash Transfers and Children's Education and Labour among Malawi's 
Poor. Development Policy Review, 30(4), 499-522. 
 
Philip, D., & Rayhan, M. I. (2004). Vulnerability and Poverty: What are the causes and how are they 
related?. ZEF Bonn, center for Development Research, University of Bonn. 
 
Robertson, L., Mushati, P., Eaton, J. W., Dumba, L., Mavise, G., Makoni, J., ... & Gregson, S. (2013). 
Effects of unconditional and conditional cash transfers on child health and development in 
Zimbabwe: a cluster-randomised trial. The Lancet, 381(9874), 1283-1292. 
 
Samson, Michael. (2009). Social Cash Transfers and Pro-Poor Growth. In: Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: 
Social Protection. OECD, 43-61. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
8
 
 
CHAPTER 2: HAPPINESS AND ALLEVIATION OF INCOME POVERTY: 
IMPACTS OF AN UNCONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAM ON 
WELLBEING USING A SUBJECTIVE APPROACH 
Introduction 
The importance of income for individual subjective well-being, often described as “happiness” or 
“life satisfaction”, has been debated for decades (see for example: Easterlin, 1974; Fritjters, Haisken-
DeNew, & Shields, 2004; Stevenson & Wolfers, 2008; Easterlin et al., 2010). Most evidence comes from 
examining correlations between average subjective well-being and national income in cross-sectional 
data. In richer, more developed countries income is positively correlated with happiness but with 
diminishing returns (Frey & Stutzer, 2002). At lower levels of income and in low-income countries 
however, there is a stronger linear relationship implying that income is an important determinant of 
happiness when it corresponds to a better quality of life in the sense of satisfying basic needs (Deaton, 
2008; Graham & Behrman, 2009). The relationship between low-income and happiness suggests that 
poverty alleviation programs that have direct impacts on income may have the potential to increase 
subjective well-being. Nevertheless, little is known about the subjective well-being impacts of income 
increases for the poor, especially by means of specific policy.  
This paper revisits the relationship between income and happiness and estimates the impact of an 
unconditional social cash transfer program on individual subjective well-being. Social cash transfer 
programs provide consistent cash payments to targeted, poor households. Unconditional cash transfers 
distribute payments regardless of recipient behaviors as opposed to conditional transfers such as those in 
Latin America that tie receipt to certain conditions. Limited evidence exists on the relationship between 
cash transfers and happiness, but a study in Mexico found a dissonance on objective and subjective 
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welfare; the reduction of income poverty for households in the Mexican Oportunidades program did not 
translate into a greater sense of well-being (Rojas, 2008).  
While an interesting relationship to explore on its own, there is increasing attention in the 
measurement and use of subjective well-being as a means of informing policy design (Dolan & Peasgood, 
2008). Mounting evidence has shown that subjective well-being metrics can capture individual emotional 
states and predict other measures of individual well-being such as health outcomes (Kahneman & Kruger, 
2006). They also have the potential to predict behavior across other domains such as work life and 
relationships (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005). Incorporating subjective welfare indicators into 
social policy evaluations can thus complement existing objective measures and provide a deeper 
understanding of how policies affect livelihoods across more dimensions than the economic one.  
This paper uses data from an experimental study of Malawi’s Social Cash Transfer Program to 
explore measures of subjective well-being that capture concepts of life satisfaction, relative wealth, and 
future expectations amongst household caregivers. The study collected longitudinal household data with a 
baseline survey in 2013 and a 17-month follow-up survey at the end of 2014. The households for this 
study were randomly assigned to either the treatment and control group after the baseline survey. While 
income is generally taken to be endogenous to both individual well-being and determinants such as health 
status and personality, the random assignment to treatment provides exogenous variation in income that 
allows us to identify the impact of such increases on subjective well-being. As a starting point, our 
empirical specification models subjective well-being traditionally as an additive function of individual 
determinants. We then use panel data methods to control for time trends and unobserved individual 
characteristics to elicit a casual impact of income. 
This investigation finds that household income increases from the cash transfer can have substantial 
subjective well-being gains among caregivers. We find large, significant effects of treatment on both life 
satisfaction and future outlooks, which are robust across empirical specifications and additional controls. 
Specifically, after about a year’s worth of transfers, caregivers in beneficiary households score 0.50 SD 
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higher on the Quality of Life scale and are over 20 percentage points more likely to believe in better 
future in two years using panel data specifications.   
Background 
Subjective well-being is defined by Diener, Lucas, and Oishi (2009) as an individual’s evaluation 
of his or her life from both emotional and cognitive perspectives. Therefore, high subjective well-being 
can include the recurrent experience of positive affect (and low negative affect) as well as high life 
satisfaction. In practice, surveys such as the Gallup World Poll tend to capture more of the cognitive 
aspect of subjective well-being with questions about how an individual assesses their quality of life. 
Economists have traditionally been critical of these quality of life measures though because self-reports 
are assumed to be unreliable signals for individuals’ underlying preferences and constraints that affect 
actual behavior. Instead, they have relied on revealed preference analysis, examining observable 
consumption and investment behavior with the underlying assumption that these measurable choices 
better reflect the set of unobservable trade-offs of preferences and constraints (Graham & Behrman, 
2009).  
Regularly, however, people’s choices are not aligned with their own happiness. Literature from 
behavioral economics and psychology finds that people habitually make inconsistent choices, departing 
from the standard model of the rational economic agent (Kahneman, 2003). Evidence from developing 
country contexts finds that people repeat the same mistakes, fail to participate in market opportunities, 
and make myopic decisions that fail to take account of their long-term welfare such borrowing at very 
high interest rates (Anderson & Stamoulis, 2006; Banerjee & Duflo, 2004, Banerjee & Mullainthan, 
2010). Revealed preference analysis is therefore limited in providing explanation of other factors 
influencing important choices, such as self-control problems and constraints like poverty that might result 
in perverse choices (Graham & Behrman, 2009). Moreover, personal psychological states have been 
clearly linked to individual economic and social behaviors. Decision-makers with positive life outlooks 
are expected to make better choices for themselves and their household such as seeking preventive care or 
  
 
11
investing in human capital because happiness increases decision-makers’ cognitive flexibility and self-
control to carefully assess their future (Isen 2008; Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005).  
In theory, collecting subjective data allows researchers to test fundamental economic assumptions 
because subjective data directly captures well-being (Frey & Stutzer, 2002). While the assumption that 
income is a basic determinant of subjective well-being has been tested and affirmed, supporters of the 
subjective approach do not condone using income to exclusively evaluate welfare for the risk of 
overvaluing policy impacts. There are other human needs and values that cannot be directly bought or 
enriched with income such as emotional support and personal relationships as well as autonomy and 
human development. Moreover, focusing solely on income neglects the fact that income may not be used 
efficiently and that well-being could depend more on relative rather than absolute consumption (Rojas, 
2007). Alleviation of income poverty might not be enough to increase individual’s overall sense of well-
being if other dimensions of their life are going poorly. As Rojas (2009, 2015) describes in his ‘subjective 
well-being approach’, the goals of poverty alleviation programs may be compromised if dissonances 
emerge between subjective and objective measures. Policies that cannot improve people’s lives across 
more dimensions than absolute income may not lead to successful transitions out of intergenerational 
poverty since well-being involves other aspects such as work, relationships, and communities. Thus, 
including subjective well-being measures within evaluations of social programs can complement 
objective measures to provide a better picture on the effect of policies across more dimensions than the 
economic one. 
Though subjective well-being analysis may be useful in policy evaluation, it is important to point 
out that individuals’ perception of well-being are not easily comparable between people. Even if 
subjective questions can appropriately capture individual well-being, researchers expect that individuals 
have different interpretations of subjective questions, which will bias interpersonal comparisons (Beegle, 
Himelein, & Ravallion, 2012). Nonetheless, econometric techniques that control for unobserved 
heterogeneity among individual responses makes the use of subjective survey data more acceptable for 
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policy analysis (Graham & Behrman, 2009). Moreover, recent findings indicate that differences in 
individual viewpoints present little bias in relative well-being data (Beegle et al., 2012), and measures of 
life satisfaction have been validated as a good correlate across other measures of well-being including 
economic, psychological, physiological ones (Dolan, Peasgood, & White, 2008; Kahneman & Kruger, 
2006).  
Therefore, subjective well-being measures have become increasingly popular among economists 
and policy analysts for the purpose of measuring individual and social welfare (e.g. Kahneman & Kruger, 
2006; Mullainathan, 2005; Rojas, 2008; Rojas, 2009; Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2009; Di Tella & MacCulloch; 
2006). However, despite the growing use and acceptance subjective well-being data, literature on well-
being and income rarely makes causal claims because survey data is usually missing the exact timing of 
changes in income and happiness, raising concerns about reverse causality. A few studies, however, have 
been able to test this causality by utilizing natural exogenous variations in income. For instance, Frijters, 
Haisken-DeNew, and Shields (2004) use the reunification of Germany to show that income gains for East 
Germans resulted in lasting gains on individual life satisfaction. Gardner and Oswald (2007) use data on 
lottery winners in Britain, to show that mid-size wins result in better psychosocial health for winners 
compared both to those with no wins or smaller wins. Experimental data, however, is missing because as 
Gardner and Oswald (2007) point out “…it is not possible to run giant experiments where, in the name of 
science, different amounts of government-funded research cash are randomly allocated to treatment and 
control groups (p 50).” 
This paper fills this important gap by exploiting the randomized study design to measure the causal 
impact of income increases on subjective well-being. Evaluations of unconditional cash transfer programs 
have just recently started to measure subjective well-being. In Kenya, Give Directly, an NGO that gives 
one-time unconditional cash payments to poor households, found that the program had strong positive 
effects on happiness and life satisfaction measures (Haushofer & Shapiro, 2013), however, there were 
larger negative spillover effects for neighbors that did not receive the transfer (Haushofer, Reisinger, & 
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Shapiro, 2015). Another working paper by Handa and company (2014) also uses subjective data from 
Kenya. The paper examines the country’s large-scale government-run unconditional program (CT-OVC) 
and shows that subjective measures performed well and correlated to expected material well-being and 
demographic measures. The evidence from Kenya’s CT-OVC program, however, is limited to cross-
section analysis. This study uses longitudinal data from Malawi and thus improves upon this evidence by 
controlling for ex-ante well-being and any unobserved individual heterogeneity in survey responses. 
Additionally, comprehensive survey data allows us to control for individual and household determinants 
of subjective well-being including baseline consumption. 
Study Setting and Design 
Location 
Malawi is a small, landlocked country in southern Africa. The majority of the nation’s population 
(51 percent of 16.7 million) lived below the poverty line in 2014 and the vast majority of the population 
reside in rural areas, living as subsistence farmers. The country is one of the poorest in Africa; Malawi’s 
2014 GNI per capita figure of $790 (PPP, current international $) is less than 25 percent of the SSA 
average of $3382 (World Bank, 2014). According to the same data source, gross enrollment in secondary 
school was a low 37 percent in 2013, and unemployment was high at 14.8 percent for women and 12.6 
percent for men aged 15-24 years in 2014.  
The Malawi SCTP program 
The Government of Malawi’s (GoM’s) Social Cash Transfer Program (SCTP) is an unconditional 
cash transfer program targeted to ultra-poor, labor constrained households in Malawi. The main 
objectives of the program are to alleviate hunger and poverty among households and to improve 
children’s well-being and human capital through education, nutrition, health, and household productivity. 
The program began as a pilot in the Mchinji district in 2006 and since that time, the program has 
expanded to 18 districts and reached approximately 175,000 as of January 2016.  
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SCTP beneficiary selection is made through a community-based approach with oversight 
provided by local and national government. Appointed community members are responsible for 
identifying households that meet the eligibility criteria of being ultra-poor and labor constrained. After 
further screening of identified households by the GoM, including a proxy means test to meet the ultra-
poor eligibility condition, the recipient list is generated. The program’s goal is that these lists target the 
bottom 10 percent of each community (Malawi SCTP Evaluation Team, 2015). An early evaluation of the 
Malawi SCTP in Mchinji confirms that recipient households live in extreme poverty and have higher 
dependency ratios than other poor households (Miller, Tsoka, & Reichert, 2010). Additionally, household 
heads tend to be older (above 60) and upwards of 80 percent of households are missing at least one prime-
age adult, highlighting their particular vulnerability to the impacts of HIV/AIDS (Handa et al., 2013).  
The SCTP provides a monthly unconditional cash transfer to eligible households, which vary 
depending upon the number and school status of members in the household. Table 2.1 shows transfer 
amounts in Malawi Kwacha (MWK) that were in use at time of follow-up data collection (first column, 
‘Prior to May 2015’) and the new transfer levels that were increased in May 2015.  
Table 2.1. Structure and level of transfers (current MWK)  
 Prior to May 2015 After May 2015 
1 Member  1,000  1,700  
2 Members  1,500  2,200  
3 Members  1,950  2,900  
4+ Members  2,400  3,700  
Each primary school child1  300  500  
Each secondary school member2  600  1,000  
1Provided for household residents age 21 or below in primary school. 2 Provided for household residents age 30 or 
below in secondary.  
Source: Malawi Social Cash Transfer Program Midline Impact Evaluation Report (2015) 
 
The ‘rule of thumb’ among policy experts is that size of the transfer should amount to at least 20 
percent of baseline consumption in order to have measurable impacts (Davis & Handa, 2015). Before the 
increase in transfer amounts in May 2015, the majority of beneficiaries in this study’s sample had a share 
below this 20 percent threshold. The average share was 18 percent and 50 percent of beneficiaries had a 
share below 15 percent.  
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Study Design  
Data comes from the impact evaluation of Malawi’s SCTP undertaken by UNC-Chapel Hill’s 
Carolina Population Center and University of Malawi’s Center for Social Research. The design consists 
of a cluster-randomized longitudinal study with a baseline survey and two follow-up surveys. This study 
only uses the baseline survey conducted mid-2013 and the first follow-up survey conducted in late 2014 
through early 2015. The household survey is the main survey instrument covering a comprehensive list of 
topics including household composition, consumption, economic activity, education, health, time use, and 
subjective welfare among others. A qualitative component also includes in-depth individual interviews 
with the caregiver and one youth from 16 treatment households selected using a stratified sampling 
approach. This study has IRB approval from both the University of North Carolina (IRB Study No. 14-
1933) and Malawi’s National Commission for Science and Technology (IRB Study No. RTT/2/20). 
The evaluation was designed around the GoM’s plans to extend and expand coverage of the SCTP 
within in Malawi over three years starting in 2013. In order to integrate the impact evaluation with early 
expansion plans in 2013, two districts, Salima and Mangochi, were chosen for this study. Random 
selection was included at all possible levels, including the two smaller levels within these districts, 
Traditional Authorities (TAs) and Village Clusters (VCs). First, two TAs in each district were first 
randomly selected to participate in the evaluation study and then eligible beneficiary lists from each VC 
within these four TAs were generated following normal program operating guidelines described above. In 
the second stage, VCs were randomly selected to arrive at a necessary sample size of 3,500 based on 
power calculations for key program outcomes. In Salima, all eligible households were selected in the 
VCs. In Mangochi, 125 eligible households per VC were randomly selected in each selected VC. The 
final sample for the study was drawn from 29 VCs and comprises 3,531 households, approximately 47 
percent of all eligible households from the four TAs. 
The quantitative baseline survey was administered over several months from June to September 
2013 to the study sample of 3,531 households (1,678 treatment and 1,853 control). Households were not 
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assigned to treatment (T) and control (C) status until after the baseline survey in order to maintain 
objectivity during data collection. Half of the VCs in each TA were randomly assigned the treatment 
group to start receiving the cash transfer right away. The other half of the VCs was assigned to the 
delayed-entry control group and entered the program in late 2015. This cluster randomization approach is 
preferable to household randomization in this study because it reduces concerns that treatment effects 
could become contaminated due to households living in close proximity with other study participants 
(Malawi SCTP Evaluation Team, 2013). The design is also more administratively and ethically feasible 
because the program did not have the financial resources to reach all households immediately.  
The follow-up occurred at the end of 2014 and concluded in February 2015. Overall attrition was 
low, 95 percent of the baseline sample was retained and detailed attrition analysis finds no evidence of 
selective attrition. Beneficiary households had received five or six cash payments at the time of follow-up 
data collection. Each payment accounted for two months so results can be interpreted as one-year impacts 
of the program (Malawi SCTP Evaluation Team, 2015). 
An important note about the follow-up is that this survey was conducted in Malawi’s lean season 
while baseline was conducted after the harvest. There was a significant decline in consumption of around 
25 percent for both study arms at follow-up, on par with regional consumption fluctuations between the 
same time periods in Malawi’s 2010 Integrated Household Survey. However, the SCTP appears to be 
protective for beneficiary households during these seasonal changes as evidenced by greater average 
consumption across a number of food and nonfood categories (Malawi SCTP Evaluation Team, 2015).  
Data  
For our purposes in this paper, the sample includes households who responded to subjective well-
being questions in both waves. There was one respondent per household, typically the main caregiver in 
the household but not necessarily the household head. The full household panel includes 3,365 
households (1,605 treatment and 1,760 control) consisting of all households that responded to subjective 
well-being questions in both waves. The individual panel of 2,919 (1,520 treatment and 1,399 control) 
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consists of the same respondent in both waves and is a smaller subset of these households.  
Measures  
To measure subjective well-being this study includes constructs of quality of life, relative well-
being, and future expectations. Quality of life measures are constructed from a series of questions gauging 
individual’s perceptions of life satisfaction (Douthitt, MacDonald, & Mullis, 1992). Life satisfaction 
refers to a person’s global assessment of their life such as whether they find life pleasant or fulfilling. 
This is considered a cognitive, judgmental process, where a person’s judgments are dependent upon a 
comparison of one's present circumstances with a standard which each individual sets for him or herself 
(Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). Therefore, we did not externally impose any reference for 
comparison so that subjective well-being measures center on a person's own judgments. 
To measure the quality of life, respondents were asked how much they agree with the following 
statements from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1): 
1. In most ways my life is close to ideal. 
2. The conditions in my life are excellent. 
3. I am satisfied with my life. 
4. So far I have gotten the important things I want in life. 
5. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing. 
6. I feel positive about my future. 
7. I generally feel happy. 
8. I am satisfied with my health. 
These questions are drawn from the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS) (Diener et al., 1985) and 
the WHO Quality of Life Scale (WHOQOLS)(WHO, 1998). The first five questions comprise the SWLS, 
which is narrowly focused on an individual’s overall life satisfaction. The SWLS has shown good internal 
consistency and construct validity (Kobau, Sniezek, Zack, Lucas, & Burns, 2010). The last three 
questions come from the WHOQOLS and covers positive affect as well as overall quality of life. Quality 
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of Life (QoL) is a continuous measure generated by summing the responses from each item of the scale. 
The resulting scale ranges from 8 to 40 with higher scores reflecting greater quality of life.  
The study also collects caregiver perceptions of their relative well-being with respect to their 
societal economic status. Literature has confirmed that income evaluated relative to others has a 
significant effect on individuals’ perception of well-being at least among developed societies (Clark et al., 
2008). Evidence from developing societies is more inconsistent. For example, Ravallion and Lokshin 
(2010) find that among the poor in Malawi, subjective well-being is not correlated with mean income in 
one’s neighborhood. However, Fafchamps and Shilpi (2009) find that relative consumption is an 
important predictor of subjective well-being among the poor even in isolated villages in Nepal.  
We measure relative well-being using a visual stepladder with six choices from poor (1) to rich (6). 
Respondents are asked to place themselves on one of these steps in addition to their neighbors and 
friends. We generated two binary variables, one that measures relative well-being in comparison to 
friends and the other in comparison to neighbors. The variables measure if individuals perceive 
themselves to be either the same or better off compared to worse off than their friends and neighbors. 
The last construct, future outlooks, is measured by asking respondents for their perception of how 
they feel their life will go (better, same, or worse) in one, two, and three years from now. Binary 
indicators measure whether individuals feel their life will be better off in the future compared to the same 
or worse off. As compared to life satisfaction, which is an assessment of one’s current circumstances, 
these questions on future well-being have respondents gauge the unknown future and tap into concepts of 
expectation and optimism. Psychological theory proposes that optimism as a personality trait would affect 
subjective well-being through expectations about the future (Scheier & Carver 1985). Some literature has 
found that dispositional optimism correlates well with other measures of subjective well-being such as life 
satisfaction and positive affect (Lucas Diener, & Suh, 1996). Optimism may also be a latent sentiment 
too. Experimental evidence from an intervention targeting gratitude show that participants exposed to a 
self-guided reflection of their blessings targeting could cultivate optimism about the near future (Emmons 
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& McCullough, 2003).  
The independent variable is treatment status, a binary measure for households randomly chosen to 
receive the cash transfer. Individual correlates of subjective well-being controlled for include age, age-
squared, gender, marital status, education, and chronic health issues (Dolan et al., 2008; Wiemann et al., 
2015). Baseline values of household correlates are also controlled for including household size and total 
members in age groups (0-5, 6-11, 12-17, 18-65, and 65+). Baseline values of these measures are used 
because household composition could be endogenous to the income shock. 
If a positive income shock increases happiness, shocks that would reduce income such as death of 
an income earner should analogously have a negative impact on happiness. By testing the relationship 
between negative shocks and subjective well-being, we can ensure that our measures are sensitive to 
negative shocks and respond appropriately. Respondents were asked about negative shocks that occurred 
within the previous 12 months such as floods and droughts, high food prices, death and serious illness of 
household members, and conflict or violence. We test a couple of measures, total number of shocks and 
an indicator for the death of an income earner. In addition, respondents were asked to assess the 
likelihood of experiencing negative shocks in the next year, a food shortage and needing financial 
assistance. Indicators for each shock measure whether the respondent believes there a likely or very likely 
chance the event will occur in the next year. 
Methods 
 
The determinants of subjective well-being (SWB) are typically modeled empirically as an additive 
function of the social, economic, and environmental factors (Xs) involved where the error term (εi) 
captures individual differences in reporting (Dolan et al., 2008). : 
    =  + 	

 + 	 + ⋯ +  
We start with this basic specification and use three different models to test the effect of treatment on 
SWB. First is an OLS linear regression model on the wave 2, cross-section data.  
(1)    =   + 	
 + 	 +  
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Yi is the individual measure of subjective well-being, Ti is an indicator variable for being in a treatment 
household, and Xi  is a vector of individual control variables.  
The second model is a Differences-in-Differences (DD) regression model, which uses panel data to 
account for baseline values of SWB and group level differences across the two study arms. Equation 2 
shows the basic empirical specification where Yit is an individual, time specific measure of subjective 
well-being, Ti*Pt is an indicator for cash transfer receipt in the second wave and represents the DD 
estimate of the treatment effect since it is the product of treatment status (Ti) and second time period (Pt).  
(2)   =   + 	
 ∗  + 	 + 	 + 	 +  
The final specification is a fixed effects model to control for individual reporting differences and 
unobserved characteristics such as personality that might bias the treatment effects. These show up in the 
unobserved error term, Vi, and are assumed fixed over time. Individual fixed effects will also wipe out 
any time indifferent control variables such as gender and treatment status.  
(3)  =   + 	
 ∗  + 	 + 	 +  +  
Regressions include household probability weights and standard errors are clustered at the village 
cluster level, the level of random assignment to treatment. 
Results  
Randomization and Summary Statistics 
The data for this study comes from a carefully designed, randomized experiment and thus in 
theory, second round results should be enough to find a treatment effect if randomization was successful 
at balancing T and C groups. Nonetheless, in a field experiment that is part of a larger governmental 
intervention, successful randomization is more difficult to achieve than experiments designed and 
implemented by the same research team. For example, we might find bureaucrats affecting randomization 
(intentionally or not), resulting in imperfect implementation. Randomization may also be imperfect and 
where randomization results in unevenness between groups, it is important to control for those baseline 
characteristics. Bruhn & McKenzie (2009) even recommend controlling for baseline variables that are 
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thought to influence future outcomes, whether or not their means are statistically different, because 
including variables that are good predictors of the outcome soak up residual variance, increasing power. 
Additionally, examining balance in this particular evaluation is important because the randomization of 
the program was done at the cluster level, while the outcomes of interest are at the individual level. 
Table 2.2. Success of randomization: key indicators at baseline by treatment status 
 Baseline characteristics  
 Treatment    Control   
Observations 1,608 1,761 
Key Program Indicators   
Poverty and Food Security   
Poverty rate, individuals (%) 90.3 92.8 
Eat only one meal per day (%) 21.3 19.1 
Economic Activity & Productive Assets (households)   
Operate an enterprise (%) 24.1 22.6 
Cultivate land (%) 95.6 96.0 
Selling any crops (%) 21.6 23.9 
Adult Health (age 50+)   
Morbidity  (%) 55.9 49.9 
Any disability (%) 13.9 14.9 
Adolescent Schooling & Labor    
Ganyu work for pay (age 10-17) 41.1 38.9 
School enrollment (14–17)   64.3 71.3 
Safe Transitions to Adulthood   
Ever had sex (age 13-19) 34.8 31.6 
Depressive symptoms (age 13-19) 44.9 50.6 
Young Child Health & Nutrition   
Underweight (age 0-5) 19.3 16.9 
Consumed Vit A rich foods previous day (6-59 months) 67.4 60.9 
Demographic and Household Characteristics   
Per Capita Consumption (mean annual MWK) 43,891 41,357 
Age (mean) 58.7 56.8 
Female (%) 83.2 84.8 
Chronic illness (%) 47.2 40.5 
Ever attended school (%) 27.8 30.4 
Married (%) 29.8 29.2 
Household size (mean) 4.5 4.5 
Number of shocks in past 12 months (mean) 2.5 2.5 
Death in past 12 months (%) 3.8 3.2 
Believes will have future financial or food shock in next 12 months (%) 53.5 53.3 
Notes: No significant differences between baseline T and C groups at (p-value<0.1) 
 
The baseline summary statistics presented in at the bottom panel of Table 2.2 show that the vast 
majority of caregiver respondents are female (over 80 percent) with an average age just below 60. 
Approximately a third of the sample has attended school at some point in their life and another third is 
  
 
22
currently married.  
The study’s main evaluation focuses on six key areas and primary outcomes in these areas were 
tested for statistical differences between the two groups at baseline using OLS regression and accounting 
for the survey design to adjust standard errors. The top panel of Table 2.2 shows that randomization was 
successful for the panel sample used here in all key program areas. Mean characteristics between the 
treatment and comparison groups are balanced across these domains and there are no significant 
differences (p-value<0.1). In addition, all outcome and control variables used in this paper are balanced at 
baseline as shown in the bottom panel of Table 2.2. 
At baseline, we also interviewed 821 ineligible households that were randomly selected from the 
same village clusters. We use this ineligible group to place our sample’s responses in context and give 
evidence that subjective measures correspond to expected objective characteristics. Given that eligible 
households are the poorest households in the community, ineligible households have a number of 
different characteristics. Ineligible households are wealthier, have fewer household members, and 
household heads are younger and more likely to be married.  
Figure 2.1. Histogram of QoL scale scores at baseline for eligible and ineligible households 
 
 
Quality of Life: 
The internal consistency of the Quality of Life (QoL) scale is respectably high with a Cronbach 
Alpha score of 0.83 (using both waves). Factor analysis reveals a single construct consistent with the 
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literature on life satisfaction scales (Frey & Stutzer, 2002). Figure 2.1 graphically shows the distribution 
of scores at baseline for the full eligible sample and ineligibles. 
At baseline, the mean value for eligible respondents is 18 compared to 21 for Ineligibles. About 
10 percent of eligible respondents report the lowest value (8) on the QoL scale, while only 0.1 percent 
report the highest value (40) and 95 percent of respondents have a value lower than 30. In comparison, 
scores for ineligibles have a more normal distribution and only 6 percent report the lowest score while 12 
percent have a score over 30. 
Table 2.3. Baseline values of subjective well-being for T, C and Ineligibles 
 Treatment Control Ineligible 
  Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
QOL scale score1 17.5 (6.6) 18.2 (6.9) 21.2 (7.5) 
Scale items    
In most ways my life is close to 
ideal 
2.0 (1.1) 2.0 (1.2) 2.4 (1.2) 
The conditions in my life are 
excellent 
2.1 (1.2) 2.2 (1.3) 2.5 (1.3) 
I am satisfied with my life 2.4 (1.3) 2.5 (1.4) 2.9 (1.3) 
So far I have gotten the important 
things I want in life 
1.8 (1.1) 1.8 (1.0) 2.1 (1.2) 
If I could live my life over, I 
would change almost nothing 
2.3 (1.3) 2.3 (1.4) 2.5  (1.3) 
I feel positive about my future 2.2 (1.2) 2.3 (1.2) 2.8 (1.3) 
I generally feel happy 2.3 (1.2) 2.4 (1.2) 2.8 (1.3) 
I am satisfied with my health 2.5 (1.3) 2.6 (1.4) 3.2 (1.4) 
Future well-being    
Better in a year 0.53  0.53 0.67 
Better in 2 years 0.45 0.47 0.61 
Better in 3 years 0.42 0.46 0.59 
Relative well-being    
Same or better off than neighbors 0.48 0.52 0.64 
Same or better off than friends 0.43 0.49 0.63 
Self 1.2 (0.5) 1.2 (0.5) 1.6 (0.7) 
Neighbors 1.9 (0.8) 1.9 (0.9) 1.9 (0.9) 
Friends 1.9 (1.0) 1.9 (1.0) 2.0 (1.0) 
Observations 1,678 1,853 821 
1 Range of 8-40 from the sum of scale item questions (scored 1-5) 
 
Table 2.3 reports subjective baseline statistics for eligible T and C groups separately and 
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ineligibles. The mean value is around 18 for both T and C groups. Additionally, both T and C eligible 
respondents report middle values for life and health satisfaction (around a 2.5 out of 5), but report slightly 
lower values for all other items. Placing these values in context, we find higher values for ineligibles 
respondents living in the same communities. Their overall QoL scale score (21), both life and health 
satisfaction scores (2.9 and 3.2 respectively), and all other scale items are larger for ineligibles possibly 
reflecting the role economic hardship plays in subjective well-being for our sample. For QoL scores and 
all other measures in Table 2.3, we tested for balance by treatment status and find no significant 
differences at the 10 % level. 
Future well-being: 
Baseline statistics for future well-being measures in Table 2.3 show that majority of eligible 
households (53%) think that their life will be better in one year. However, the proportion believing life 
will be better decreases slightly when respondents think about their life in 2 years and 3 years in the 
future. Ineligible results are considerably higher but follow the same pattern of decreasing in the more 
distant future.  
Relative well-being: 
For relative well-being, Table 2.3 shows both respondents’ placements on the economic wealth 
stepladder and indicators generated from these responses on whether they believe they are the same or 
better off than their friends and neighbors. At baseline, both T and C respondents consider themselves to 
be at the bottom. On a 1 (poor) to 6 (rich) scale, respondents have mean score of 1.2 or ‘poor’. In 
comparison, respondents placed their friends and neighbors slightly higher on the scale with averages at 
1.9, almost a step above themselves. Ineligible respondents perceived themselves to be slightly higher up 
the ladder (1.6), but had the same perception of their friends and neighbors, which might shed some light 
on how much relative wealth might be a shared community concept.  
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 Empirical Analysis 
This paper focuses analysis on three subjective well-being measures that represent each area 
discussed above. The Quality of Life (QoL) scale is a continuous measure used to measure life 
satisfaction while binary indicators are used for future well-being (life will be better in 2 years) and 
relative well-being  (relative wealth is the same or above neighbors). We limit our analysis to these three 
measures as they are representative of overall data patterns as we found similar results using the other 
indicators.  
Eighty-five percent of households have the same respondents at baseline and follow-up, but some 
households have different main respondents in the two waves. We use both the household and individual 
panels albeit for some different purposes. We use the household panel to measure the impact of 
determinants on subjective well-being and to test for sensitivity of our specifications. We also report 
results of the income shock using the household panel, but the individual panel is used to control for 
personality and individual reporting differences that could affect subjective well-being responses. Using 
both samples we will be able to show whether there is any apparent bias within the results using 
household panel when we do control for these individual, personality differences. 
Determinants: 
In the first step of analysis, we look at the impact of individual and household determinants on 
our subjective well-being outcomes. According the literature on correlates of subjective well-being, 
demographic variables such as income, sex, and age are related to individual subjective well-being but 
effects are relatively small. In general, positive correlates to subjective well-being include income, self-
perceived good health, and marital status (being married) while female gender and age are more likely to 
be negative correlates (Diener et al., 2009). 
Since the expectation is that a positive income shock can increase happiness, it is important to 
understand how consumption impacts subjective well-being. Figure 2.2 graphically represents the 
relationship between consumption (in logarithms) and QoL scores (range of 8-40) using a local linear 
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regression (Lowess) model. There is a slight rise in scores as per capita (pc) expenditure increases at 
lower levels of consumption, but relationship flattens at higher levels of consumption.  
Figure 2.2. Lowess graph of QoL scores on household consumption at Wave 1 
  
 
Although the Lowess graph in Figure 1 does not display a strong relationship, Table 2.4 shows 
that log pc consumption expenditure is a strongly significant determinant of QoL at baseline. In addition 
to consumption, there are many other determinants of subjective well-being so each of the three outcomes 
were tested on the full baseline sample using linear regression and controlling for individual and 
household covariates. According to qualitative evidence from baseline, poor health is also a significant 
cause of stress and anxiety for caregivers and therefore could be an important contributing factor to low 
subjective well-being. Table 2.4 shows that chronic illness (proxy for poor health) is an important 
determinant of QoL, lowering scores by 1.6 points for suffers of chronic illnesses. Additionally, being 
married is a strong, positive determinant of QoL increasing scores by 1.2 points over non-married 
caregivers. Other strong determinants of QoL at baseline include a caregiver’s age (negatively associated) 
and household composition variables (both positive and negative).  
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Table 2.4. Baseline determinants of subjective well-being among caregivers (OLS) 
 Life will be better in 2 
years 
Quality of life scale Relative well-being: 
same or better off than 
neighbors 
Treatment -0.03 -0.87 -0.06 
 (0.06) (0.92) (0.06) 
Female -0.04 -0.15 -0.05 
 (0.03) (0.45) (0.02)* 
Age -0.00 -0.09 0.00 
 (0.00)* (0.03)** (0.00) 
Age squared 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00)* (0.00) 
Ever attended school 0.05 -0.18 0.03 
 (0.03)* (0.31) (0.02) 
Chronic illness -0.05 -1.59 -0.02 
 (0.03)* (0.59)** (0.03) 
Married 0.05 1.16 0.06 
 (0.02)** (0.31)*** (0.02)** 
Log pc expenditure 0.06 1.22 0.03 
 (0.03)** (0.40)*** (0.02) 
Household size 0.01 0.33 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.18)* (0.02) 
Household Members:    
0-5 years -0.01 -0.29 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.24) (0.02) 
6-11 years -0.00 -0.43 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.19)** (0.02) 
12-17 years 0.02 -0.08 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.17) (0.02) 
65 and over -0.04 -0.46 -0.01 
 (0.02)** (0.21)** (0.02) 
Constant 0.12 8.52 0.16 
 (0.31) (4.47)* (0.24) 
R2 0.06 0.06 0.02 
N 3,369 3,369 3,369 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
 
The other subjective well-being outcomes, future and relative well-being, show some similar 
relationships with individual and household determinants but have fewer significant ones. Log per capita 
expenditure is a strong, positive predictor of future well-being (p-value<0.05) but it is not predictive of 
relative well-being. Chronic illness is also a significant, negative predictor of future well-being. Notably, 
gender is only predictive of relative well-being. The heavy saturation of female caregivers in the sample, 
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however, means there is not much gender variation to test. The only significant determinant across all 
outcomes is being married, which has a positive association with subjective well-being. 
In addition to the baseline sample, we use the panel of control group respondents to measure 
determinants—these are households that never receive the cash transfer during the study period. Table 2.5 
shows the impacts of determinants using a fixed effects model to control for any unobserved differences 
fixed overtime. We use the household panel to pull out some impacts for variables that could change 
between members of households but that are fixed within individuals like gender and whether they ever 
attended school.  
Table 2.5. Determinants of subjective well-being among control group using household fixed effects 
 Life will be better in 2 
years 
Quality of life scale Relative wealth: same 
or better off than 
neighbors 
Time 0.05 1.62 -0.05 
 (0.03) (0.59)** (0.05) 
Female 0.07 0.84 -0.10 
 (0.07) (0.82) (0.06) 
Age 0.00 -0.16 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.08)* (0.01) 
Age squared -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ever attended school 0.12 2.32 -0.09 
 (0.06)* (1.12)* (0.08) 
Chronic illness -0.01 -1.06 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.45)** (0.05) 
Married 0.10 2.52 0.06 
 (0.06) (0.70)*** (0.06) 
Log pc expenditure 0.08 0.56 0.04 
 (0.04)* (0.70) (0.04) 
Constant -0.38 15.78 0.09 
 (0.50) (7.82)* (0.38) 
R2 0.03 0.07 0.01 
N 3,197 3,444 3,438 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
 
 Compared to the baseline sample, the impact of log pc expenditure is much smaller and less 
significant for future well-being (p-value<0.1) and no longer predictive of QoL. There are still a number 
of other significant predictors of QoL though, including positive ones such as ever attending school and 
being married. In contrast to the baseline sample, school attendance has a positive effect (p-value<0.1) on 
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QoL and future well-being for this panel of control households. Gender, however, is no longer a 
significant a determinant of relative well-being.   
 Taken together, determinant analysis for these two groups reveals that our measure of life 
satisfaction, QoL scale, is more strongly predicted by individual and household variables than future 
outlooks or relative well-being. Consumption and poor health have stronger relationships to subjective 
well-being at baseline than amongst the control group panel. Additionally, being married is the only 
determinant of all of the subjective well-being variables at baseline. In general, determinants appear to 
have the expected relationships with subjective well-being measures according to the literature. 
Effect of treatment on subjective well-being: 
Next we estimate the impact of the treatment (cash transfer) on subjective well-being. We first 
show the effect of log per capita expenditure on QoL scores again but with Wave 2 data to determine if 
the relationship between expenditure and happiness differs discernibly after receiving transfers. As 
mentioned earlier, per capita consumption expenditure is much lower at follow-up due to data collection 
occurring during the lean season. Therefore, the control group is key to our estimation strategy as it 
accounts for this seasonality.  
Figure 2.3. Lowess graph of QoL scores on household consumption for T and C at Wave 2 
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Figure 2.3 shows the relationships between QoL and consumption in Wave 2 separately for T and C 
groups. At Wave 2, the relationship between consumption and QoL scores has not changed much since 
baseline. While both treatment and control lines show little relationship between QoL scores and 
consumption, the treatment group clearly has higher QoL scores across all levels of consumption. This 
divide is largest at lower levels of consumption and weakens at the highest levels of consumption. 
As described in the Methods sections, we estimate three specifications to test the impact of 
treatment on our subjective well-being outcomes. Results are shown in Tables 6-8.  For each outcome, we 
start with an unadjusted model using the full household panel and then sequentially add individual and 
household controls. The last model includes all controls and keeps only households in the individual 
panel (same respondent in both rounds).  
The results of treatment on subjective well-being using the OLS specification are shown in Table 
2.6. The cash transfer has a positive and significant impact on caregivers’ subjective well-being for QoL 
and future well-being. The largest effect sizes for each outcome are seen in the last models, which 
includes all controls and the individual panel. Caregivers in treatment households score 2.57 points 
greater on the QoL scale, which represents 18 percent of the mean and has a magnitude of 0.35 of a 
standard deviation (SD). This is similar to the Give Directly study results showing an increase of 0.45 SD 
in the overall index of psychological well-being for the treatment group, which is higher than the effects 
on happiness (a 0.19 SD) and life satisfaction (0.14 SD) individually. Additionally, caregivers receiving 
the cash are 18 percentage points more likely to believe in a better future. The impact of the cash transfer 
is strongly robust across all measures; point estimates are only slightly larger for QoL with additional 
controls. Furthermore, the treatment impact for QoL and future well-being maintains strong significance 
(p-value<0.01) across all models.   
The second specification we test in Table 2.7 is a DD model with panel data to control for baseline 
scores and time trends. Results in Table 2.7 show that using panel data to control for baseline scores is 
important and makes a difference for both the magnitude and significance of treatment outcomes. In 
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comparison to the OLS results, QoL estimates are larger and more significant across all models (p-
value<0.01). The magnitude of point estimates has increased by almost one point from 2.57 to 3.42 (or 
0.5 SD) for the individual panel. Also, treatment effects on future well-being are slightly larger and 
strongly significant at the 1% level. The last model using the individual panel shows that caregivers in 
treatment are 22 percentage points more likely to believe in a better future. While relative well-being 
point estimates are also larger, treatment respondents are twice as likely (a 6 percentage point increase) to 
believe they are the same or better off than their neighbors22, results are insignificant.  
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Table 2.6. OLS analysis of cash transfer on measures of subjective well-being in Wave 2 
 Life satisfaction  
(Quality of Life Scale) 
Future well-being 
 (Life will be better in 2 years) 
Relative well-being  
(Same or better off than neighbors) 
Treatment 2.26 2.41 2.40 2.57 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 
 (0.61)*** (0.56)*** (0.56)*** (0.53)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Demographics  X X X  X X X  X X X 
Household 
Characteristics 
  X X   X X   X X 
Individual 
panel 
   X    X    X 
Constant 19.80 20.36 15.61 13.57 0.52 0.55 0.28 0.34 0.44 0.41 0.32 0.33 
 (0.25)*** (1.35)*** (2.95)*** (3.19)*** (0.02)*** (0.10)*** (0.23) (0.25) (0.03)*** (0.10)*** (0.26) (0.28) 
R2 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 
N 3,365 3,364 3,364 2,919 2,839 2,838 2,838 2,455 3,353 3,352 3,352 2,907 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. Controls include Demographics (Female, age, age squared, ever attended school, 
chronic illness, married;) Household characteristics (Baseline values of log per capita expenditure, household size, total age group categories,(0-5, 6-11, 12-17, 65+)) 
 
Table 2.7. Difference-in-differences (DD) analysis of cash transfer on measures of subjective well-being 
 Life satisfaction  
(Quality of Life Scale) 
Future well-being 
 (Life will be better in 2 years) 
Relative well-being  
(Same or better off than neighbors) 
Treatment*Time 3.31 3.28 3.18 3.42 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 
 (0.88)*** (0.89)*** (0.89)*** (0.94)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Time 1.54 1.53 1.56 1.42 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.59)** (0.58)** (0.59)** (0.61)** (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Treatment -1.05 -0.89 -0.84 -0.90 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.94) (0.93) (0.91) (0.94) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Demographics  X X X  X X X  X X X 
Household 
Characteristics 
  X X   X X   X X 
Individual panel    X    X    X 
Constant 18.26 19.99 11.37 10.46 0.47 0.63 0.17 0.23 0.49 0.43 0.26 0.24 
 (0.68)*** (0.83)*** (2.80)*** (2.99)*** (0.03)*** (0.08)*** (0.18) (0.20) (0.04)*** (0.06)*** (0.19) (0.21) 
R2 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
N 6,896 6,895 6,733 5,838 6,370 6,369 6,207 5,374 6,884 6,883 6,721 5,826 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. Controls include Demographics (Female, age, age squared, ever attended school, 
chronic illness, married;) Household characteristics (Baseline values of log per capita expenditure, household size, total age group categories,(0-5, 6-11, 12-17, 65+)) 
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Table 2.8. Fixed effects analysis of cash transfer on measures of subjective well-being 
 Life satisfaction  
(Quality of Life Scale) 
Future well-being 
 (Life will be better in 2 years) 
 
Relative well-being  
(Same or better off than 
neighbors) 
Treatment*Time 3.20 3.23 3.45 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.12 0.12 0.13 
 (0.88)*** (0.88)*** (0.92)*** (0.07)** (0.07)** (0.07)*** (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Time 1.56 1.53 1.48 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 
 (0.60)** (0.60)** (0.64)** (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Demographics  X X  X X  X X 
Individual panel   X   X   X 
Constant 17.76 21.95 32.17 0.45 0.58 0.67 0.46 0.61 0.73 
 (0.21)*** (1.28)*** (5.37)*** (0.02)*** (0.15)*** (0.46) (0.02)*** (0.15)*** (0.34)** 
R2 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 
N 6,896 6,895 5,838 6,370 6,369 5,374 6,884 6,883 5,826 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. Controls include Demographics (Female, age, age squared, ever attended school, 
chronic illness, married;) Household characteristics are defined at the baseline and drop out of fixed effects models. 
 
Interestingly, time also has a significant effect on QoL scores, an impact of about 1.5 points. Despite this time trend, the impact of the cash 
transfer is still larger compared to the OLS model in Table 6. Thus, controlling for baseline differences and time trends is important; it leads to 
slightly larger treatment effects and increases internal validity.  
In the final specification, a fixed effect model, we add to the last model by introducing an individual-level fixed effect to control for any 
unobserved, individual heterogeneity in responses such as personality and different reporting scales. The results in Table 2.8 show that there is no 
change in the treatment effect with addition of individual fixed effects suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity is not a concern for this sample. 
Point estimates are robust for each outcome and are still significant at the 1% level for QoL and future well-being in the individual panel. The 
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addition of fixed effects also slightly increases the treatment impact on QoL scores amongst the 
individual panel to 3.45 points (0.5 SD), the largest point estimate of all models.  
Additional analysis: 
The results from these three specifications give strong evidence that cash transfer receipt is leading to a 
greater quality of life and belief in a better future, however, the income increase does not appear to impact 
relative well-being. Happiness literature though suggests that relative well-being could actually work as a 
determinant of happiness instead of a measure of well-being on its own (Weinmann et al., 2015). 
Therefore, in Table 2.9 we add baseline values of relative well-being (same or better off than neighbors) 
as an additional control to test whether perceptions of relative standing directly impacts the two other 
outcomes. We only compare OLS and DD specifications because fixed effect models drop these time 
invariant baseline covariates. Compared to Table 2.6 and 2.7 estimates, the treatment effect in Table 2.9 is 
unchanged (both significance and magnitude) after controlling for relative well- being at baseline. The 
direct effect of relative well-being is also insignificant and thus relative well-being is not a determinant of 
subjective well-being of our sample. 
Table 2.9. Effect of cash transfer on QoL scale and future well-being controlling for baseline SWB 
(individual panel) 
 Life satisfaction  
(Quality of Life Scale) 
Future well-being 
 (Life will be better in 2 years) 
 OLS DD OLS DD 
Treatment*Time  3.42  0.22 
  (0.94)***  (0.07)*** 
Treatment 2.57 -0.94 0.18 -0.04 
 (0.52)*** (0.92) (0.04)*** (0.06) 
Time  1.42  0.03 
  (0.61)**  (0.04) 
Baseline relative well-being  -0.15 -0.53 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.20) (0.34) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 13.57 10.49 0.34 0.23 
 (3.20)** (3.00)*** (0.25) (0.20) 
R2 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.09 
N 2,919 5,838 2,455 5,374 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. Controls include Demographics 
(Female, age, age squared, ever attended school, chronic illness, married;) Household characteristics (Baseline values of log per 
capita expenditure, household size, total age group categories,(0-5, 6-11, 12-17, 65+)) 
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Sensitivity Analysis:  
 
Thus far in our analysis, the QoL scale has shown high internal validity since it is consistent and 
robust across specifications. Internal validity, however, is also dependent on the ability of the measure to 
correctly represent the concept it defines; for QoL this concept is life satisfaction. As a sensitivity analysis 
to test the construct validity of the QoL scale, we examine whether the scale predicts negative shocks in 
the expected opposite direction as treatment to confirm that it incorporates appropriate emotional affect in 
response to one’s experiences.  
Using the individual panel, we test a fixed effects specification on three measures of shocks: the 
number of shocks in the previous 12 months, household death in the previous 12 months, and anticipation 
of a future shock (either financial or food) in the next 12 months. Additionally, we include treatment as a 
control in a second model to further see whether the cash transfer is protective of life satisfaction above 
these negative shocks. Since shocks could arguably be endogenous to treatment and we depart from 
causal analysis to validate this construct, in Table 2.2 we do show that these shocks are balanced at 
baseline. At follow-up, the total number of shocks in the previous year decreased from a mean of 2.5 to 
fewer than 2 for both groups, but the percent of the sample that experienced a death remained constant 
around 3 percent. Additionally, both groups were less likely to believe in future shocks at follow-up (T, 
34 % and C, 44 %), declining from 53 percent at baseline.  
The results in Table 2.10 show that each of these shocks has a negative relationship with QoL, 
serving to defend its construct validity. Each additional shock a household experienced in the previous 12 
months decreases QoL scores by almost one point, significant at the 1% level. Likewise, the shock of a 
household member’s death significantly decreases scores by 1.4 points. Belief of future shocks decreases 
scores by 2.3 points, also significant at the 1% level. With the addition of the treatment variable 
(treatment*time), both total shocks and future negative shocks still have a significant impact on QoL 
scores and point estimates are on the same order of magnitude. Moreover, the treatment effects in the 
second models are similar in size and significance as the effects found in Tables 2.8 and 2.9, validating 
  
 36
the robustness of the cash transfer impact on QoL for beneficiary households. Negative shocks and the 
positive income shock, therefore, appear to be orthogonal to each other and life satisfaction is an 
experience that can respond to multiple external events at the same time. 
Table 2.10. Effect of negative shocks and anticipated future shocks on QoL scale using fixed effects 
(individual panel) 
 Type 
of 
Shock 
Number of shocks in 
last 12 months 
Death in household in 
last 12 months 
 
Believes will have 
future shocks 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Effect of shock  -0.86 -0.86 -1.41** -1.11 -2.33 -2.13 
  (0.18)*** (0.19)*** (0.67) (0.73) (0.47)*** (0.41)*** 
Treatment*Time   3.46  3.43  3.20 
   (0.82)***  (0.93)***  (0.92)*** 
Time  2.55 0.83 3.18 1.47 2.86 1.30 
  (0.60)*** (0.58) (0.61)*** (0.64)** (0.58)*** (0.64)* 
Age  -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 -0.42 -0.42 
  (0.18)** (0.16)*** (0.19)** (0.17)*** (0.18)** (0.16)** 
Age squared  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00)** (0.00)*** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** 
Chronic illness  -0.84 -0.70 -0.88 -0.75 -0.95 -0.81 
  (0.45)* (0.42) (0.45)* (0.43)* (0.42)** (0.41)* 
Married  1.66 1.79 1.75 1.90 1.60 1.74 
  (0.65)** (0.63)*** (0.66)** (0.64)*** (0.67)** (0.65)** 
Constant  34.95 34.80 32.57 32.37 32.15 32.03 
  (5.95)*** (5.25)*** (6.04)*** (5.36)*** (5.80)*** (5.21)*** 
R2  0.14 0.17 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.17 
N  5,838 5,838 5,838 5,838 5,838 5,838 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. Household characteristics are 
defined at the baseline and drop out of fixed effects models. 
 
Discussion 
This study reveals that in just about a year’s time, Malawi’s cash transfer can have a profound 
effect on the subjective well-being of caregivers in beneficiary households. We find a strong, positive 
impact of the income shock on individuals’ life satisfaction and perception of future well-being but do not 
find any impact on their perception of relative well-being. This finding lines up with evidence of positive 
impacts on objective measures of well-being at the household and individual-level. Appendix Table A1 
illustrates the variety of impacts found during the follow-up midline evaluation including strong impacts 
on food consumption, economic productivity, school enrollment, and morbidity (Malawi SCTP 
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Evaluation Team, 2015). As the program aims to reduce hunger, the cash importantly helps to increase 
food expenditures and the number of meals eaten compared to the control group. This shows that the 
program was particularly protective for households during the lean season when the survey was 
conducted. Additionally, households used the money to increase agricultural productivity, purchasing 
livestock and agricultural assets, and increasing crop production. Furthermore, another main use of the 
cash is to help meet the costs of sending children to school; there were strong impacts on child schooling 
including increased enrollments and decreased dropouts (Malawi SCTP Evaluation Team, 2015).   
While these positive impacts would in most respects appear to be good news, there is a concern 
amongst some that such programs could result in “leapfrogging”. In the context of cash transfer programs, 
leapfrogging refers to a situation when program beneficiaries quickly move to a higher standard of living 
that leaves behind other community members who were nearly as poor but did not receive the program 
(Ellis, 2012). In this situation, feelings of unfairness and bitterness could arise and lead to lowered social 
cohesion within the community. This could help explain the negative subjective well-being consequences 
found in the Give Directly study as transfers make up a large percentage of pre-program consumption, but 
given that the Malawi SCTP distributes smaller transfers and only to a small percentage of the 
community, leapfrogging is likely less of a concern. The relative well-being results also suggest this is 
true since beneficiary caregivers still do not rate themselves as better off than their neighbors or friends. 
This quantitative evidence from Malawi is also substantiated by qualitative evidence from in-depth 
caregiver interviews collected at follow-up. Caregivers in beneficiary households describe how the cash 
has been crucial for them to afford to eat regular meals, make home improvements, buy livestock, and 
send their children to school. Many of their stresses are alleviated, making them happier. Asked about 
personal changes since her baseline interview, one caregiver says, 
There has been an improvement in my heath and also my heart condition. I used to be very 
worried and stressed in the past because I had too much responsibility yet there wasn’t 
enough money to take care of all those responsibilities. But since we started receiving 
money from the cash transfer program I have been able to take care of some 
responsibilities that I couldn’t then. As a result I worry less and am usually happy which 
also has contributed to the improvements in my health and heart condition.  
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This statement highlights the importance of income to improve livelihoods for the very poor 
populations this program targets as well as the connection between health and happiness. Additionally, 
caregivers admit that they are hopeful for the future. General feelings are that they believe their lives will 
continue to get better and their children’s future will be more promising as they are able to continue with 
their education. For example, another caregiver explains that she is happier and less worried now about 
the future because of the transfer, 
As I have said am a happy person now, I no longer have stress and am not worried because 
I know that when the time comes to receive the money, I will be able to buy things the 
household lacks now. 
 
Moreover, she is also grateful to the government throughout the interview suggesting that gratitude and 
future outlooks may go hand in hand, 
Am just thankful because my household was very poor, in a rain season like this, sleep 
could not come because the house was leaking. We were really very poor, today my 
children have sleeping mats, are able to wash and bath using soap, and there is food in the 
household, so I say, thank you. 
 
In addition to the substantiation from the objective measures and qualitative evidence, we find that 
the results of the cash transfer on subjective well-being are very robust. Both QoL and future well-being 
are strongly significant across all specifications and models. The cross-section OLS specification is 
predictably the least precise because it does not control for the time trend or baseline scores. In the other 
two specifications that use panel data, effects of the cash transfer are larger and change little with the 
addition of the controls. Even introducing treatment into regressions of negative shocks on subjective 
well-being does not reduce the strong, positive impact of the cash transfer. Moreover, results from Table 
2.10 show that negative and positive shocks together can have strong, independent impacts on life 
satisfaction, possibly reflecting how positive and negative psychological states can exist simultaneously 
(Diener and Emmons, 1984; Watson, 1988). Literature has even found that in times of severe stress such 
as the death of a family member, co-occurance of aversive psychological states is common and part of the 
coping process (Folkman, 1997).  
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The positive time trend, however, is an anomaly. It is unclear why control households reported 
higher life satisfaction and future outlooks at the second wave. There was no concurrent rise in external 
economic circumstances, and in fact follow-up data collection occurred during the lean season when 
consumption was much lower for all households, a decline of around 25 percent from baseline (Malawi 
SCTP Evaluation Team, 2015). While it was the lean season, it was also the rainy season during follow-
up data collection, and a possible connection could exist between the rains and subjective well-being if 
the rains signal that the growing season is under way and bounty is to come. However, some recent 
literature has rejected the use of intrapersonal comparisons (Wiemann et al., 2015). According to Rayo 
and Becker (2007), people develop internal references in response to life circumstances as an 
evolutionary response in order to sustain a minimum level of satisfaction. Therefore, individuals’ criteria 
for a satisfied life can change overtime depending on context. It is impossible to say for sure that 
individuals interpret questions the same between time periods. Differences in references points at the time 
of survey could change the interpretation of subjective well-being questions such that an individual’s 20 
on the QoL scale in 2013 does not correspond the same level of happiness that a 20 does in 2015. While 
this could create noise in our estimates, the large sample size and experimental design help validate our 
results—the noise would randomly be assigned. Even withstanding this interference, we are not making 
conclusions about the values reported but instead are concerned about trends in the data overtime as an 
effect of an exogenous income shock. 
Interestingly, while results are strongly positive for measures of quality of life and future well-
being, we find no impacts on relative well-being. According to the literature, people’s happiness is judged 
relative to an internal reference point, which is determined by their past experiences and environments. 
Therefore, the perception of low relative economic standing in a community reflects lower happiness 
because compared to others, there is potential to be happier. As reported in the Data section, transfer size 
as a share of pre-program household consumption is lower than the generally accepted 20 percent 
threshold for most households. It might be that this modest increase in income is not enough for 
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households to consume as much as their friends and neighbors and so relative to their community, they 
are still worse off. Therefore, the absolute income effect is likely driving the positive results we see for 
life satisfaction and future well-being. The null effect, however, seems to align with prior work in Malawi 
that found no impact of income on relative well-being among the poorest communities (Ravallion & 
Lokshin, 2010).  
Limitations 
As discussed throughout this paper, the limitations of this study mainly concern the reliability of 
subjective well-being measures. For one, they might suffer from measurement error because of 
personality bias or affect at the time of survey. Additionally, behavioral economic literature has pointed to 
issues that could confound results like biases of “reference points” and “habituation”  (Kahneman, Diener, 
& Schwarz, 1999) even amongst individuals overtime (Rayo & Becker, 2007). While the time trend 
observed amongst control group in this study may suggest changing perceptions of subjective questions 
between baseline and follow-up, we do not put emphasis on the actual value of measures (the main 
concern expressed in the literature about reporting subjective well-being results) but instead focus on 
changes in trends between treatment arms. Since our results are strong and robust, and as the study uses a 
randomized design with a large sample size, this reduces concern that the reliability of measures is an 
issue. 
Individual heterogeneities could also present a problem when making interpersonal comparisons of 
welfare as we do with the household panel. This study is strengthened by its use of experimental, panel 
data and methods that control of individual heterogeneities. We use fixed effects among the individual 
panel to wipe away personality biases and differences in interpretations. However, in accordance with 
recent evidence from Beegle et al. (2012) that finds biases have only a minor impact, we also find trivial 
differences between the household and individual panels so personality biases are not a concern in this 
sample. 
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Finally, there is concern that subjective well-being measures are not a good marker for 
understanding how poor people in particular are doing. People habituate and adapt to their situations and 
so the chronically poor may have lower thresholds for defining their well-being. The poor in India, for 
instance, are quick to say that they have high life satisfaction even though this does not line up with 
objective measures of health and productivity (Clark, 2012). Thus, their responses to subjective well-
being questions could be impractical as a means of understanding how poverty affects overall welfare 
because their responses inadequately reflect their deprivation in areas such as health, material essentials, 
and education (Sen, 1990). While this would confound estimation of the relationships between poverty 
and subjective-wellbeing, making it harder to understand how cash transfers actually impact subjective 
well-being, the purpose of using subjective well-being data in this study is to compare welfare impacts of 
a program given to a homogenous group of poor households. We focus on data trends and do not interpret 
the meaning of reported values. Moreover, we do not suggest solely relying on subjective well-being to 
assess overall well-being and the capability of someone to rise out of poverty. We are suggesting that it 
could be an additional component and illustrate well-being on a more holistic level since it can 
incorporate other elements important to human flourishing. 
Conclusion  
This study shows that a positive income shock from a large-scale cash transfer program in Malawi 
has a strong positive impact on beneficiary caregivers subjective well-being both in terms of life 
satisfaction and future outlooks. The randomized, longitudinal study design combined with strong, robust 
impacts allows us to defend a causal relationship between income and subjective well-being. Objective 
and qualitative evidence from the Malawi SCTP evaluation further substantiate this evidence. Even small 
income increases are immensely valuable to the very poor. Caregivers use the money to improve their 
families’ livelihoods, ensuring provision of their basics needs including food, shelter, and clothing. The 
reduction of these daily stresses makes caregivers happy about their current situations and gives them 
hope that the future will continue to get better.  
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The use of self-reported well-being may help capture a more inclusive picture of well-being than 
would reliance only on objective measures. The subjective approach is a broader concept and can include 
other important dimensions of a person’s well-being such as social connectedness, pleasurable 
experiences, and life meaning (Rojas, 2015).  It also is an end goal for many of the other things people 
seek like income—it is not desired for itself but because it can help people to achieve happiness. 
Nevertheless, self-reports of well-being are limited when it comes to public policy, especially given that 
the poor’s reported happiness may minimize their true deprivation. Governments could potentially justify 
a lack of progress towards greater social equality by asserting that the poor are nevertheless happy. 
Ultimately, governments should not rely exclusively on either objective or subjective measures to judge 
welfare but used together they can more accurately reflect well-being.  
Future research will be needed to understand if the absolute income effect will continue to have an 
impact on subjective well-being or if happiness will flatten out as people habituate to their new 
circumstances. Haushofer, Reisinger, and Shapiro (2015) find some evidence for hedonic adaptation after 
revisiting Kenyan households in the Give Directly cash transfer study. They find that effects for both 
treatment and control groups dissipated over time once the transfers stopped. However, the important 
distinction again between this program and Malawi’s is that the Give Directly scheme provides one-time 
transfers compared to the more consistent, long-term transfers from the SCTP and other similar 
government programs.  
It will also be important to investigate how greater life satisfaction can influence spending decisions 
and future outcomes. Cash transfer and other poverty alleviation program evaluations should continue to 
include subjective well-being metrics to add to this evidence base. With the growth of cash transfer 
programs across Africa, it will be important to find out whether there is an association between growth in 
these metrics and successful transition out of poverty cycle. This critical knowledge can be used to 
enhance the effectiveness of social protection policy for the poor across Africa. 
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CHAPTER 3: CASH TRANSFERS AND HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION: CAUSAL 
EVIDENCE AND MECHANISMS 
 
Introduction 
 
The accumulation of human capital during childhood is one of the most important factors 
associated with adult productivity and later-life outcomes (Rosenzweig, 1995; Psacharopoulos, 1994). 
Education is a crucial factor in building children’s human capital and it is also an important determinant 
in decreasing poverty and inequality (Glewwe & Kremer, 2006). Global development goals have thus 
focused on increasing education for all children and over the past few decades there have been vast 
improvements in school enrollment rates across all regions of the developing world. Most children in 
these regions now complete primary school and many also go on to obtain at least some secondary-level 
education (Glewwe & Muralidharan, 2015). Nevertheless, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) still lags behind 
other developing regions of the world. Indeed, the majority of world’s children that are not enrolled in 
school live in the SSA (United Nations, 2015). Even though many countries in the region provide free 
primary education, there are often other expenses like obligatory uniforms that make primary school too 
expensive for some families. Moreover, even if children do complete primary school, secondary 
education is usually much more cost prohibitive for poor households (Baird, Ferreira, Ozler, & Woolcock, 
2012).  
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), introduced in 2015, have a more ambitious goal of 
universal completion of primary and secondary school. While universal access to schooling may be 
accomplished with heavy investments in the supply-side interventions, universal completion goals cannot 
be achieved without ensuring household demand for education (Bruns, Mingat, & Rakotomalala, 2003). 
In SSA, this household demand is unlikely to be met without reducing the barriers parents face in sending 
their children to school including both direct and indirect costs (Glewwe & Kassouf, 2010).  
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This paper analyzes the effect of a large, government-run unconditional cash transfer program on 
child schooling in rural Malawi. Although primarily a poverty-alleviation intervention, we examine 
whether and how the cash may help to increase demand for schooling. This unconditional program 
distributes monthly cash payments to ultra-poor households in Malawi. Transfers comprise a significant 
share (almost 20 percent) of pre-program per capita consumption for the average household. Households 
for this study were randomly assigned to either the treatment or control group after an initial baseline 
survey, allowing us to estimate causal program impacts. A second round of data collection occurred after 
approximately 12 months of payments to treatment households. If Malawi’s program improves schooling 
outcomes, the program may help facilitate the ascent of children out of poverty given the value of 
educational attainment and human capital to achieve success in adulthood.  
This study will also help address the gap in knowledge about how cash transfer programs impact 
child development. In general, children are indirectly affected by income since parents have the 
responsibility of making household spending decisions. Interventions that provide direct income support 
may increase household demand for schooling leading to greater parental investment in their children. 
Parental mediation is therefore a likely pathway and so we examine mediation of the program through 
parental channels to understand how an unconditional cash transfer affects schooling outcomes. 
Schooling Interventions and Cash Transfers 
Existing evidence on schooling interventions in the developing world is concentrated on how 
families and their children respond to supply-side interventions. Less is known about demand-side 
interventions such as those that attempt to directly affect investment in child human capital by relieving 
financial constraints. Using the traditional model of parental investment in children’s human capital, a 
household’s decision to invest in an additional year of schooling for their child occurs when the expected 
benefits exceed the costs with respect to the present discounted value (Becker, 1962; Ben-Porath, 1967). 
Policies that attempt to increase schooling attainment through enrollment or attendance therefore target 
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this household decision either by increasing the immediate benefits or reducing the costs of sending the 
child to school.  
While demand-side interventions have not been as common as supply-side ones, a few types of 
interventions exist including scholarship programs or the elimination of school fees, and indirect 
programs like increasing maternal literacy or subsidizing transportation (Glewwe & Muralidharan, 2015). 
These interventions that either increase the immediate returns or reduce household costs to schooling have 
been generally effective at increasing enrollments and learning outcomes but are disparately cost-
effective. Cash transfer programs, which provide cash to poor families in an attempt to alleviate poverty, 
have become a widespread demand-side intervention. Even though programs are poverty targeted, they 
also frequently aim to increase child schooling and human capital with evidence showing them to be a 
cost-effective intervention (Glewwe & Muralidharan, 2015). In Latin America, conditional cash transfers 
(CCT) like Mexico’s Oportunidades program and Brazil’s Bolsa Familia program do this by conditioning 
cash receipt on households enrolling children in school. In SSA, unconditional programs often have goals 
to increase school enrollment, however, they distribute cash payments regardless of recipient behavior.  
While there is ample evidence that both conditional and unconditional cash transfers help 
children and youth stay in school (Baird et al., 2012; Robertson et al. 2013; Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation 
Team, 2012), given the differences between these programs, it is unclear if they work in the same ways. 
While conditional programs have two available mechanisms to affect household demand for schooling—
the cash has an ‘income effect’ that helps alleviate credit constraints and the conditionality produces a 
‘substitution effect’ that lowers the opportunity cost of schooling—unconditional cash transfer programs 
only work through the income effect. According to a recent review, both conditional and unconditional 
cash transfer programs have increased education enrollment rates in large part because they remove the 
financial constraints of schooling (Baird et al., 2012). Thus, if Malawi’s unconditional cash transfer 
program reduces household financial constraints, we are likely to see households choosing to invest in an 
additional year of their child’s education.  
  
 50
Mechanisms 
Since unconditional cash transfer programs provide an income supplement and let households 
decide how to spend the money, they should only indirectly affect child well-being. The impact on child 
schooling thus depends upon the household response to the income, which makes it important to 
understand the internal allocation of resources within households (Barrientos & DeJong, 2006). The 
assumption is that the income affects children initially through increased household consumption 
resulting in a greater standard of living for the whole household, but in time, households may also 
reallocate resources leading to increased child investment. A few studies have examined how cash 
indirectly works through parental decision-making to impact child outcomes. In one such experimental 
study of Ecuador’s conditional cash program, Atención a Crisis, authors find improvements in young 
children’s cognitive development are associated with increased parental investment behaviors that extend 
beyond the direct cash effect (Macours, Schady, & Vakis, 2012). 
The literature on child development has proposed a number of channels of parental behavior 
through which income may work to influence child schooling and human capital accumulation. The most 
traditional pathway, parental investment, highlights the economic component of income and argues that 
family income affects child development through its impact on parental decisions to allocate resources 
such as money and time (Becker & Tomes, 1994). Poverty limits parent’s ability to provide these 
resources meaning poor children have less exposure to materials and experiences that could benefit their 
development (Mayer, 1997; Haveman & Wolfe, 1995). Using this model, income from the cash transfer 
would primarily have an economic effect that enables children to stay in school and build their human 
capital.  
Another pathway, the family stress model, focuses on the role of low income and other economic 
hardships to inhibit child development through their effect on parental stress and emotional instability 
(Conger & Elder, 1994). Evidence shows that these states can lead to destructive consequences for 
children because they are associated with weakened relationships and harsher parenting behaviors (Guo & 
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Harris, 20002; Yeung et al., 2002, Gershoff et al., 2007). Income from a cash transfer could work through 
this pathway by decreasing financial stress and improving parental psychological well-being, which in 
turn improves familial relationships and parental support of their children’s education.  
Additionally, there may be other indirect mechanisms that could help explain cash transfer 
impacts on child schooling. Communities in rural SSA tend to be small and well connected such that 
other households are often aware of the beneficiaries. Consequently, shaming could be a factor involved 
in the cash transfer effect on schooling if community members observe household behaviors and think 
that households are not using the money appropriately. In a similar manner, households may initially 
believe (or be pressured from the community into believing) that there are actually rules attached to cash 
transfer receipt like enrolling their children in school.  
Moreover, we may observe differential impacts on schooling due to a range of contextual factors 
such as characteristics of children and families or components of the program. For instance, evidence has 
shown that programs can have different schooling effects by gender such as in South Africa where 
unconditional cash payments had the largest impact on enrollment for girls and where female-headed 
households were associated with higher enrollment rates (Duflo, 2003). It is also common to see different 
impacts by age. Older children are less likely to be enrolled in part because free schooling typically only 
applies to primary school. Additionally though, time spent in school (or on school work at home) 
decreases the availability of children to work and so older children have a higher opportunity cost because 
they are more productive workers either in or out of the household. Moreover, for women, this 
opportunity cost includes marriage and child rearing (Glewwe & Kassouf, 2010). Another important 
factor is the extent of household poverty and whether the cash supplement is large enough to allow 
families to meet the larger costs of sending children to school. The size of the cash transfer relative to 
baseline consumption is therefore important since the greater the effect of the cash to reduce a 
household’s immediate consumption needs means it can free up resources for investment purposes. 
Evidence has shown that the programs that distribute transfers with the largest share of household pre-
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program expenditures also have the largest schooling impacts (Fiszbein et al., 2009; Maluccio & Flores, 
2005). Lastly, studies have shown larger effects in populations that have lower baseline enrollments 
(Fiszbein et al., 2009).  
The Malawi SCT Program 
The Government of Malawi’s (GoM’s) Social Cash Transfer Program (SCTP) is an unconditional 
cash transfer program that aims to alleviate household hunger and poverty and also improve children’s 
well-being and human capital. The program is targeted to ultra-poor, labor constrained households. Ultra-
poor households have trouble meeting their most basic needs for both food and non-food essentials. Labor 
constrained households have a large dependency ratio, meaning that there are fewer wage earners or able-
bodied workers to dependent members including the young, the elderly, and the disabled. These targeted 
beneficiaries are selected through a community-based approach with oversight provided by local and 
national government. If they meet these two targeting conditions, they are automatically enrolled in the 
program and accordingly take up is effectively universal.  
The Malawi SCTP began in 2006 as a pilot program in Mchinji and an early evaluation confirms 
that beneficiaries are both extremely poor and vulnerable even compared to other poor households 
(Miller, Tsoka, & Reichert, 2010). Additionally, households have higher dependency ratios with few able-
bodied household members, particularly prime-age adults, which highlights the impacts of HIV/AIDS on 
this generation (Handa et al., 2013).  
The SCTP provides a monthly unconditional cash transfer to eligible households, which varies 
depending upon the number and school status of members in the household. The amount given for 
children in secondary school is double what is provided for children in primary school since there are 
school fees required for secondary school attendance. Table 3.1 shows transfer amounts in Malawi 
Kwacha (MWK) that were in use at time of follow-up data collection (first column, ‘Prior to May 2015’) 
and the new transfer levels that were increased in May 2015.  
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Table 3.1. Structure and level of transfers (current MWK)  
 Prior to May 2015 After May 2015 
1 Member  1,000  1,700  
2 Members  1,500  2,200  
3 Members  1,950  2,900  
4+ Members  2,400  3,700  
Each primary school child1  300  500  
Each secondary school member2  600  1,000  
1Provided for household residents age 21 or below in primary school. 2 Provided for household residents age 30 or 
below in secondary.  
Source: Malawi Social Cash Transfer Program Midline Impact Evaluation Report (2015) 
 
According to policy experts, the size of the transfer should amount to at least 20 percent of 
baseline consumption in order to have measurable impacts (Davis & Handa, 2015). In this study, 
households had only received the smaller transfers and the majority had a share below 20 percent. 
However, simulations show that after the increase, most households will be at or about this threshold. 
Study Design and Data  
We use data collected from an impact evaluation of Malawi’s SCTP that includes both quantitative 
and qualitative components and was designed by UNC-Chapel Hill’s Carolina Population Center and 
University of Malawi’s Center for Social Research. IRB approval from was obtained from both the 
University of North Carolina (IRB Study No. 14-1933) and Malawi’s National Commission for Science 
and Technology (IRB Study No. RTT/2/20). 
The design consists of a cluster-randomized longitudinal study with a baseline and two follow-up 
surveys. The evaluation was designed around the GoM’s plans to extend and expand coverage of the 
SCTP within Malawi over three years starting in 2013. In order to integrate the impact evaluation with 
these expansion plans, two districts were chosen for this study, Salima and Mangochi. After establishing 
the study districts, random selection was carried out at two smaller levels within these districts, 
Traditional Authorities (TAs) and Village Clusters (VCs). In the first stage, four TAs (two in each 
district) were randomly selected to participate in the evaluation study and then eligible beneficiary lists 
were generated for all VCs within these four TAs. In the second stage, with these beneficiary lists 
completed, VCs were randomly selected until arriving at a necessary sample size of 3,500 households 
based on power calculations for key program outcomes. In the end, 29 VCs were selected for inclusion in 
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this study and 3,531 households were interviewed at baseline, approximately 47 percent of all eligible 
households from the four TAs. 
For our purposes, we use data from the baseline and the first follow-up surveys. The household 
survey is a comprehensive instrument covering household composition, consumption, economic activity, 
education, and health, among others. A qualitative component also includes in-depth individual 
interviews with the caregiver and one youth from 16 treatment households selected using a stratified 
sampling approach.  
The quantitative baseline survey was administered over several months from June to September 
2013 to the study sample of 3,531 households. Households were not assigned to treatment (T) and control 
(C) status until after the baseline survey in order to maintain objectivity during data collection. Half of the 
VCs in each TA were randomly assigned the treatment group (1,678 households) to start receiving the 
cash transfer right away. The other half (1,853 households) was assigned to the delayed-entry control 
group and entered the program in late 2015. This cluster randomization approach is preferable to 
household randomization in this study because it reduces concerns that treatment effects could become 
contaminated due to households living in close proximity with other study participants (Malawi SCTP 
Evaluation Team, 2013). The design is also more administratively and ethically feasible because the 
program did not have the financial resources to reach all households immediately.  
The follow-up occurred at the end of 2014 and concluded in February 2015. Overall attrition was 
low at 5 percent. Additionally, detailed analysis finds no evidence of selective attrition. Beneficiary 
households had received five or six cash payments at the time of follow-up data collection. Each payment 
accounted for two months so results can be interpreted as one-year impacts of the program (Malawi SCTP 
Evaluation Team, 2015). 
Sample 
The main unit of analysis is the individual child. The sample includes all household children of 
primary and secondary school age (between 6 and 17) resulting in a sample size of 6,303 children. 
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Measures 
Education 
Schooling outcomes are defined for primary and secondary school aged children (ages 6 to 17) 
and include: school enrollment, temporary withdrawal, and dropout. School enrollment is defined as 
whether the child was enrolled in the current school year (2013-2014 at baseline and 2014-2015 at follow-
up). Temporary withdrawal is an indicator for whether an enrolled child left school for two weeks or more 
during the current school year. Dropout is defined for children who were enrolled in the previous school 
year but not in the current school year. All measures are self-reported by the household.  
Mechanisms 
Parental stress is measured using the four-item shortened version of the Perceived Stress Scale 
(Cohen, Kamarack, & Mermelstein, 1983; Cohen & Williamson, 1988). The Perceived Stress Scale (PSS) 
is the most widely used psychological instrument for measuring the perception of stress. The scale intends 
to measure the degree to which situations in one’s life are considered stressful. The PSS asks respondents 
to rate how often over the past month they had certain feelings that tap into how uncontrollable and 
overloaded respondents find their lives. The child’s caregiver most often answers these subjective 
questions, but when this individual is not the caregiver, it is assumed that they are involved in making 
household decisions that impact these children. Responses are given on a one to five Likert scale from 
whether they “never” or “always” feel that way. Items are summed to develop a scale with a range of 4-
20. In the follow-up survey, the full 10-item PSS scale was included. To test the 4-item scale for 
robustness, we compare the scores for the control group across these two scales. The alpha score of the 
shortened PSS is 0.63 across both rounds and the full scale is 0.74, the correlation between the two scales 
is 0.78. 
Investment is measured with indicators for child specific investment. The household survey 
included a number of items that capture household investment in children including whether the child 
owns certain material items (shoes, two sets of clothes, blanket), household expenditures on child 
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clothing, and individual expenditures on education and health. We create index measures of investment 
with these child specific material items and spending measures. One index sums the number of material 
items (shoes, two sets of clothes, blanket) giving it a range of 0-3. The other investment index is a 
summation of whether the child has more than one of the three material well-being items, and whether 
parents spent any money on child education, health, and clothing. Therefore, the range is for this index is 
0-4 with higher scores representing greater child investment.  
Methods 
The main estimation strategy for this paper is a Difference-in-Difference model (DD). Equation 1 
shows the basic empirical specification where Yit is an outcome measure for child development, Ti*Pt is 
the DD estimate of treatment effect, and includes indicators for treatment status (Ti) and second time 
period (Pt), and Xit is the set of control variables in the adjusted model.  
 (1)   
The first step in our analysis is to estimate the average treatment effect of the cash transfer on schooling. 
Logit regressions are used for binary schooling outcomes and we report the marginal effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the level of randomization, the village cluster. 
In the next step, we assess how the program works on proposed meditational channels from 
income to schooling. Our approach is as follows: we first document treatment effects on these channels 
and then analyze whether any observed treatment impacts on schooling can be accounted for by the 
program impacts on these channels. To do this we use the causal steps proposed by Baron and Kenny 
(1986) that are used to establish the necessary conditions for mediation. The three equations below are 
modified for longitudinal analysis from Baron and Kenny’s causal steps (MacKinnon, Lockwood, 
Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). Each meditational pathway is estimated separately and includes 
indicators for treatment, time, and the set of X covariates as displayed in Equation 1.  
(2) 
 
(3)
 
Yit = α + β(Ti * Pt)+ λTi +δPt +φXit + eit
Yit = α (1) + β(Ti * Pt)+ eit (1)
Mit = α (2) +δ(Ti * Pt)+ eit (2)
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(4)  
In Baron and Kenny’s model, significance is found through testing each step. Three conclusions are 
necessary: 
1) β is significant (treatment significantly affects the outcome variable in equation 2)  
2) δ is significant (treatment significantly affects the mediator in equation 3) 
3) β’ is not significant (when controlling for the mediator in equation 4, the previous 
significant relationship of treatment on the dependent variables is significantly 
diminished) 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986) 
 In all models, we include controls for a child’s age and sex, in addition to baseline values for 
being an orphan and morbidity during the two weeks prior to the interview. These variables were chosen 
because they are known to affect schooling and can thus improve the precision of the impact estimates. 
We also use controls for other variables that could affect parenting behaviors and decision-making 
including baseline values of the household head’s sex, age, and education, as well as household 
characteristics including household size, total members in different age groups, consumption, and a 
district dummy for Salima.  
Results 
Table 3.2 displays the mean baseline summary statistics for schooling outcomes and all model 
controls by treatment arm. We test for balance between treatment arms, and after accounting for the 
survey design, we find no significant differences in our measures at the 90 percent confidence interval 
level. Summary data in Table 3.2 show that at baseline our sample is equally male and female, has an 
average age of 11 years olds, and more than a third are orphans. Examining baseline levels of our 
dependent schooling outcomes, we find that over 70 percent of children 6 to 17 were enrolled in school 
during the 2012-2013 school year. Out of those children, 13.5 percent had withdrawn at some point 
during the school year across both treatment arms. 
Yit = α (3) + ′β (Ti * Pt)+ϕMit + eit (3)
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Table 3.2. Baseline sample summary statistics by treatment arm 
Treatment Control 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Male (%) 51.8 51.2 
Age (mean) 10.8 (3.1) 10.6 (3.2) 
Past 2 weeks, suffered from illness or injury (%) 16.8 18.0 
Orphan (%) 40.8 37.2 
Schooling Outcomes   
Enrolled  (%) 70.1 72.2 
Withdrawal (%) 13.5 13.5 
Dropout (%) 6.9 6.4 
Literate (Chicewa) (%) 31.4 31.4 
Household Characteristics   
Head went to school  (%) 0.37 0.36 
Head can read  (%) 0.22 0.23 
Head female  (%) 0.86 0.86 
Head age  (mean) 53.1 (18.5) 51.2 (17.8) 
Head widow  (%) 0.38 0.35 
Salima  (%) 0.52 0.56 
Total members 6 to 11  (%) 1.8 (1.1) 1.9 (1.1) 
Total members 12 to 17  (%) 1.5 (1.1) 1.4 (1) 
Total members 18 to 64  (%) 1.4 (1) 1.4 (1) 
Total members 65+  (%) 0.5 (0.6) 0.4 (0.6) 
Household size  (%) 5.9 (2) 5.9 (2) 
Baseline log per capita expenditure (mean MWK) 10.4 (0.6) 10.4 (0.6) 
N 3032 3292 
   
We also see that for both groups, dropout (left school since the previous school year) is slightly 
under 7 percent and about one-third of children are literate in Chicewa. Additionally, Table 3.2 shows that 
the vast majority of household heads are females (86 percent), only a third ever attended school, and less 
than a quarter can read. 
Empirical Analysis 
Using baseline data, we first run cross-section regressions to examine the individual and 
household demographic determinants of schooling outcomes for our sample. Results displayed in Table 
3.3 show that age and age squared are both strongly significant individual predicators of all schooling 
outcomes, and particularly for enrollment. The coefficient on age for enrollment is large and positive but 
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negative for age squared, which signifies that enrollments are large for younger ages and start to decline 
as children get older. Other individual determinants include orphan status for dropouts, and male gender  
Table 3.3. Baseline determinants of schooling 
 Enrolled Dropout  Withdrawal 
Treatment -0.02 0.01 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Age 0.23 -0.02 0.03 
 (0.01)*** (0.01)* (0.01)*** 
Age squared -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)** (0.00)** 
Male 0.00 0.00 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)** 
Past 2 weeks, suffered from illness or injury 0.02 0.01 0.05 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)*** 
Orphan 0.00 0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.01)* (0.01) 
Head went to school 0.05 0.02 0.05 
 (0.02)*** (0.01) (0.02)** 
Head can read 0.08 -0.03 -0.07 
 (0.03)*** (0.02) (0.02)*** 
Head female 0.07 -0.01 -0.04 
 (0.02)*** (0.02) (0.02)* 
Head age 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00)** (0.00) (0.00)*** 
Head widow -0.01 -0.01 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Salima District 0.06 0.01 0.00 
 (0.02)*** (0.01) (0.03) 
Total members 6 to 11 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Total members 12 to 17 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)** 
Total members 18 to 64 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01)** (0.01)* 
Total members 65+ 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Household size -0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01)* (0.01)* 
Baseline log per capita expenditure 0.08 -0.04 -0.02 
 (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01) 
N 6,303 4,070 4,543 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
and morbidity for withdrawals. In particular, morbidity (suffering from illness or injury in the past 2 
weeks) increases withdrawals by 5 percentage-points and is significant at the 1 percent level suggesting 
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that withdrawals are associated with illness. Some characteristics of the household head are also 
determinants of schooling outcomes. Parental education backgrounds are an important factor in child 
schooling, particularly whether a household head ever attended school or can read. Children living with a 
household head that attended school are 5 percentage-points more likely to be enrolled (p-value<0.01), 
however, unaccountably, they are also more likely to withdrawal. Children living with literate heads are 
also more likely to be enrolled (8 pp) and less likely to withdraw from school (-7 pp). Household financial 
situations are also important; log per capita expenditure is a significant predictor of enrollment (8 pp) and 
dropout (-4 pp).  
Next, we tested the impact of the cash transfer program on schooling outcomes (Equation 2) 
using both waves of data and the differences-in-differences (DD) specification defined in Equation 1. 
Table 3.4 shows the unadjusted and adjusted treatment impacts for each outcome.  
Table 3.4. Unadjusted and adjusted impacts of cash transfer program on schooling 
 Full sample of children ages 6-17 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Enrolled 
 
0.14 
 
0.15 
 
0.15 
 (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** 
N 12,771 12,766 12,722 
 
Dropout -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.02)** 
N 9,001 8,998 8,968 
 
Withdrawal -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
N 9,922 9,919 9,885 
 
Individual controls  X X 
Household controls   X 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
Individual controls: age, age squared male, baseline: enrolled, ever had sex, morbidity past 2 weeks, orphan / Household baseline 
characteristics (head—female, age, age squared, ever attended school, chronic illness, married) (log per capita expenditure, 
household size, total age group categories,(0-5, 6-11, 12-17, 65+)) 
 
Results indicate treatment has a strongly significant effect on school enrollment and dropout (p-
value<0.01). Additionally, effects for each outcome are robust to the addition of individual and household 
covariates. The cash transfer has a particularly large effect on school enrollment; children in treatment 
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households are 15 percentage-points more likely to be enrolled in school. The program also reduces 
dropouts by 4 percentage-points for children in treatment households. 
In addition to examining treatment impacts for the whole sample, we looked at a few subgroups 
since certain individual characteristics (sex and age) can moderate schooling impacts for reasons such as 
household preferences, cultural norms, or the returns to schooling for these groups. We look at four 
groups separately: males, females, children who are primary school aged (6-13), and secondary school-
aged children (14-17). Table 3.5 shows that the program has a robust and strongly significant impact (p-
value<0.01) for enrollment across all subgroups. Males, females, and younger school-age children are 
either 14 or 15 percentage-points more likely to be enrolled, the same impact as on the full sample. 
Secondary school-age children, however, are slightly more likely to be enrolled (19 pp). For other 
schooling outcomes, dropout and withdrawal, there are some differential impacts by subgroup. The 
program has a greater protective effect on males and younger children. Both males and younger children 
are less likely to dropout (-6 and -4 pp respectively, p-value<0.05) and to withdraw (both -7 pp, p-
value<0.10).  
Table 3.5. Impact of cash transfer program on schooling by different groups 
 Males Females Ages 6-13 Ages 14-17 
Enrolled     
Treatment Impact 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.19 
 (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** 
N 6,535 6,187 9,728 2,994 
Dropout     
Treatment Impact -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.02)** (0.02) (0.02)** (0.03)* 
N 4,626 4,342 6,674 2,294 
Withdrawal     
Treatment Impact -0.07 -0.03 -0.07 -0.01 
 (0.04)* (0.04) (0.04)* (0.04) 
N 5,078 4,807 7,757 2,128 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01.    
Individual controls: age dummies, male, baseline: enrolled, ever had sex, morbidity past 2 weeks, orphan / Household baseline 
characteristics (head—female, age, age squared, ever attended school, chronic illness, married) (log per capita expenditure, 
household size, total age group categories,(0-5, 6-11, 12-17, 65+)) 
 
 Furthermore, we examine treatment effects for those not enrolled at baseline in order to discern if 
the program is helping to bring children to school (either for the first time or returning) as opposed to 
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primarily keeping children in school. Baseline enrollment is accordingly a zero for everyone in this 
sample so we only use follow-up data and report single-difference treatment impacts. Results in Table 3.6 
show that the program also has significant and large schooling impacts on this group. First, they are 21 
percentage-points more likely to be enrolled over the control group at follow-up. Secondly, they are less 
likely to leave school, treatment having both a significant impact on dropouts (-11 pp) and withdrawals (-
5 pp). Therefore, the program appears to have an important impact of not only keeping children in school 
but also helping them attend for the first time or return to school.  
Table 3.6. Impact of cash transfer program on schooling for children not enrolled at baseline 
 Enrolled Dropout Withdrawal 
Treatment 0.21 -0.11 -0.05 
 (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)* 
N 1,935 929 1,255 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
 
Mediation analysis 
 
Earlier we proposed and defined potential mechanisms through which a cash transfer program 
might work to affect child-schooling outcomes. We identified two main parental channels—increased 
investment in adolescents and reductions in parental stress. We operationalize these channels with the 
PSS score for parental stress and index measures for child material items and child investment spending.  
Table 3.7. Baseline summary statistics for mediation channels by treatment arm  
 Treatment  
Mean (SD) 
Control 
Mean (SD) 
Total material well-being items (0-3) 1.3 (0.9) 1.2 (0.9) 
Blanket (%) 35.3 34.1 
Shoes (%) 20.1 17.2 
Extra set clothes (%) 75.5 68.7 
Total individual spending categories (0-3) 0.9 (0.7) 0.9 (0.7) 
Any education spending (%) 64.5 64.3 
Any health spending (%) 12.8 13.1 
Any clothing spending (%) 15.7 14.8 
Parental stress (PSS score) (4-20) 14.8 (3.2) 15.0 (3.4) 
N 3032 3292 
 
We first display baseline summary statistics for these potential mediation channels in Table 3.7 
and test for balance between treatment and control groups. We find no significant differences between 
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treatment arms. Results in Table 3.7 show child ownership of material items vary by item such that while 
a small proportion of the sample own shoes, most children own an extra set of clothing. Our sample is 
also much more likely to have education expenditures over health or clothing expenditures. Finally, 
parental stress is towards the upper end of the PSS scale indicating high stress among child caregivers.  
As the first step of causal mediation analysis, we document how the program affected these 
proposed parental channels. We use a DD specification (equation 3) to model the effect of treatment on 
our mediators. Results are displayed in Table 3.8 with the top panel showing the treatment impacts on the 
indicators that comprise our indices and the bottom panel showing the treatment impacts on these indices, 
which we further use to test parental mediation in the next step. The index measures include child 
material well-being items (blanket, shoes, two sets clothing), child investment (more than one material 
well-being item, any education spending, any health spending, any clothing spending), and the Perceived 
Stress Scale for the household caregiver. We also test a child investment index without education 
spending because expenditures are non-zero only for enrolled students, making it a strong predictor. Thus, 
we can compare these two indices to identify if other aspects of child investment also account for 
mediation.  
Results indicate that the program has strong, significant impacts on most of these mediation 
channels amongst our school age sample. Treatment increases the likelihood of household expenditures 
on both child education (16 pp) and clothing (24 pp). Children in treatment households are also more 
likely to own two of the three material items: shoes (14 pp) and a blanket (16 pp). The index measures 
include these indicators and therefore it follows that treatment has large positive effects on all child 
investment indices. Children in treatment households have more material items (p-value<0.05) and child-
specific investment spending is greater whether or not we include education as a category (p-value<0.01). 
Additionally, caregivers are less stressed, they score 1.2 points lower (-0.35 SD) on the Perceived Stress 
Scale, significant at the 10 percent level.  
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Table 3.8. Impact of cash transfer program on mediators  
 Treatment Impact 
Binary Measures  
Two sets clothes 0.06 
 (0.05) 
Shoes 0.14 
 (0.05)*** 
Blanket 0.16 
 (0.07)** 
More than one item (clothes, shoes, or blanket) 0.19 
 (0.07)*** 
Any education 0.16 
 (0.03)*** 
Any health 0.01 
 (0.02) 
Any clothing 0.24 
 (0.05)*** 
Index Measures  
Child material well-being items (0-3) 0.36 
 (0.14)** 
Child investment with education (0-4) 0.64 
 (0.12)*** 
Child investment without education (0-3) 0.51 
 (0.10)*** 
Perceived Stress Scale (4-20)  -1.19 
 (0.59)* 
N 12,722 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
Individual controls: age dummies, male, baseline: enrolled, ever had sex, morbidity past 2 weeks, orphan / Household baseline 
characteristics (head—female, age, age squared, ever attended school, chronic illness, married) (log per capita expenditure, 
household size, total age group categories,(0-5, 6-11, 12-17, 65+)) 
  
Next, we re-estimate our main specification from Table 3.4 but this time include values of the 
mediators to test whether the treatment effect is explained in part or in whole by each mediation channel. 
In the rest of this analysis, we only examine mediation for enrollment and dropout because there was no 
observed treatment effect for withdraws and so the first condition of causal mediation analysis was not 
met (treatment effects schooling).  
In Table 3.9, we add each mediation index measure separately into our outcome DD specification 
(equation 4). For all models we include the same controls used in the regressions in Table 3.4 but also add 
baseline values of the specific mediation measure being tested to control for any confounding between the 
mediator and treatment. This step is important for justifying causal claims of mediation because only 
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treatment was randomized and not the mediators. In order to make causal claims in this situation, the 
mediator should be regarded as “as-if” randomized between treatment arms. Therefore, all potential 
values of the outcome should be conditioned on the observed treatment and pretreatment covariates 
(Imani, Keele, & Tingely, 2010).  
In Table 3.9 we find that, except for Columns 2 and 6, treatment effects are unchanged after 
adding in mediation index measures. The only measure with a mediating effect on the direct treatment 
impact of the cash transfer is the investment index that includes education spending. The addition of 
education spending within the index measure results in complete mediation of the direct treatment effect 
in Columns 2 and 6 since the treatment coefficient is not significantly different from zero. Since we find 
no impacts for an investment index without education spending, the treatment effects are being driven by 
the increase in education spending in beneficiary households. To understand this relationship more fully, 
we examine education spending in greater detail in the next section. 
In additional analysis not shown here, we also test mediation for the subgroups shown in Tables 
3.5 and 6. Results display the same pattern for each sample except on enrollment for older, secondary 
school age children (aged 14-17). Comparable to the full sample, only the investment index with 
education has a significant effect, however, the treatment impact is not fully mediated. Investment has a 
strong impact, but the program still increases enrollment by a significant 8 percentage points (p-
value<0.05). If education expenditure is not accounting for the whole impact of the cash transfer for older 
children, it may be possible that these children have different cost barriers. The direct costs of schooling 
might not be the biggest barrier if they already have items like a uniform and supplies from previous 
school year. However, older children may have a higher opportunity cost of going to school compared to 
younger children because they are more productive workers and can earn income for the household. In 
that case, the cash transfer could be reducing the demand for children labor, allowing older children to 
return to school. We therefore examined child labor amongst older children as a mediation channel but 
find no significant effects. 
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Table 3.9. Impact of cash transfer program on enrollment and dropout including mediators  
 Enrolled Dropout 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Treatment  0.15 0.03 0.15 0.15 -0.04 -0.00 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.02)*** (0.02) (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)** (0.01) (0.02)** (0.02)** 
Mediators 
 
        
Material well-being items  0.01    -0.01    
 (0.01)    (0.00)    
Investment with education spending  0.18       
  (0.01)***    -0.08   
Investment without education spending   0.01   (0.01)***   
   (0.01)    -0.00  
Perceived Stress scale    0.00   (0.01) 0.00 
    (0.00)    (0.00) 
N 12,418 12,410 12,410 12,721 8,842 8,834 8,834 8,967 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
Individual controls: age dummies, male, baseline: enrolled, ever had sex, morbidity past 2 weeks, orphan / Household baseline characteristics (head—female, age, age squared, 
ever attended school, chronic illness, married) (log per capita expenditure, household size, total age group categories,(0-5, 6-11, 12-17, 65+)) 
 
Education expenditures 
Given the importance of education spending, we further examine what aspects of this spending most affects schooling outcomes. Table 
3.10 shows different measures of overall education expenditures to describe the extent to which education spending mediates the treatment impact 
on schooling. We use three measures: education expenditures in Malawi Kwacha (MWK), log of education expenditures, and a binary measure for 
‘any expenditures’. The top panel shows the program effect on each mediator. Unsurprisingly, the program strongly impacts all three measures (p-
value<0.01). In Column 1, we see that treatment results in a 344 MWK increase in education spending. This translates to a 118% increase in 
expenditures (Column 2) or a 16 percentage-point increase in having any expenditure (Column 3). In the bottom panel, we include each mediator 
separately into the outcome regression models for enrollment and dropout and find that the treatment effect is completely mediated in all but one 
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model. Using a continuous measure of education expenditures (MWK), the treatment impact on 
enrollment in Column 1 is only partially mediated, the effect size is reduced to 9 percentage-points (from 
15pp), but it is still significant at the 1 percent level.    
Table 3.10. Impact of cash transfer program on schooling including education expenditure 
mediators 
  Education Expenditures 
(MWK) 
(1) 
Log education 
expenditures 
(2) 
Any education 
expenditures 
(3) 
T on M     
 Treatment 344.91 1.18 0.16 
  (73.88)*** (0.20)*** (0.03)*** 
 N=12,690    
T on Y 
with M 
 Enrollment 
 
 Treatment 0.09 -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.02)*** (0.02) (0.02) 
 Mediator 0.00 0.12 0.82 
  (0.00)*** (0.09)*** (0.02)*** 
 N=12,135    
  Dropout 
 
 Treatment -0.02 0.01 0.02 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
 Mediator -0.00 -0.07 -0.52 
  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.04)*** 
 N=8,829    
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
Individual controls: age dummies, male, baseline: enrolled, ever had sex, morbidity past 2 weeks, orphan / Household baseline 
characteristics (head—female, age, age squared, ever attended school, chronic illness, married) (log per capita expenditure, 
household size, total age group categories,(0-5, 6-11, 12-17, 65+)) 
 
Since expenditures are only zero for both dropouts and children not enrolled, education spending 
does not vary for this group, which in large part explains the large impact of overall education spending. 
Since the household survey collected data on the specific categories of education spending, we further 
examine the spending on different categories to untangle the relationships between education 
expenditures and the treatment impact on schooling. For ease of interpretation and because certain 
categories have very low expenditures, we continue analysis using the binary expenditure measures.  
Table 3.11 reports the baseline proportions of enrolled children that had expenditures in each 
category by treatment arm. The most common category is notebooks and stationary with approximately a 
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third of children in both arms having expenditures. School contributions and uniforms were the next most 
common categories, however, tuition is a rare expense for these children because the vast majority attends 
government primary schools without fees. No significant differences were found between treatment arms. 
Table 3.11. Proportion of enrolled children with any expenditure on education categories by 
treatment arm at baseline 
 Treatment Control 
Education expenditure categories:   
Tuition 0.03 0.02 
Extra lessons 0.11 0.10 
Notebooks & stationary 0.38 0.33 
Uniform 0.15 0.14 
Boarding fees 0.01 0.00 
School contribution 0.31 0.24 
Transport 0.01 0.00 
PTA and other fees 0.14 0.10 
N 2,174 2,386 
 
Table 3.12. Impact of cash transfer program on education expenditures   
 Treatment Impact  
Tuition 0.01 
 (0.01) 
Extra lessons 0.02 
 (0.04) 
Notebooks & Stationary 0.15 
 (0.06)** 
Uniform 0.17 
 (0.03)*** 
Boarding fees 0.00 
 (0.00) 
School contribution 0.09 
 (0.08) 
Transport 0.00 
 (0.00) 
PTA or other fees -0.04 
 (0.03) 
N 12,722 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
Individual controls: age dummies, male, baseline: enrolled, ever had sex, morbidity past 2 weeks, orphan / Household baseline 
characteristics (head—female, age, age squared, ever attended school, chronic illness, married) (log per capita expenditure, 
household size, total age group categories,(0-5, 6-11, 12-17, 65+)) 
 
Following the causal mediation steps, we next test the effect of the program on expenditure 
categories for our sample. Table 3.12 shows the DD treatment impacts on the likelihood of children 
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having education expenditures in each category. We find that the program has a strong positive impact on 
the likelihood of child expenditures on both notebooks (15pp, p-value<0.05) and uniforms (17 pp, p-
value<0.01). We therefore continue analysis for these two spending categories and estimate equation 4 
again including notebooks and uniform as mediators (and baseline values of each measure).  
In Table 3.13 we find that for both notebooks and uniforms, the direct treatment effects on 
dropout are fully mediated while the effects on enrollment are partially mediated. From the original direct 
treatment effect (15 pp), spending on notebooks reduces the treatment effect on enrollment down to 6 
percentage-points (p-value<0.10) and spending on uniforms reduces the effect to 9 percentage-points (p-
value<0.01). Moreover, we find that the coefficients on both notebooks and uniforms are large and 
significant at the 1 percent level. Spending on notebooks has a particularly large protective effect on 
schooling—39 percentage-point increase on enrollment and a 13 percentage-point reduction in dropouts.  
Table 3.13. Impact of cash transfer program on schooling including education expenditure 
mediators 
 Enrolled  Dropout  
Treatment 0.06 0.09 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.03)* (0.02)*** (0.02) (0.02) 
Mediators     
Notebooks & Stationary 0.39  -0.13  
 (0.03)***  (0.01)***  
Uniform  0.17  -0.05 
  (0.01)***  (0.00)*** 
N 12,172 12,172 8,865 8,865 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
Individual controls: age dummies, male, baseline: enrolled, ever had sex, morbidity past 2 weeks, orphan / Household baseline 
characteristics (head—female, age, age squared, ever attended school, chronic illness, married) (log per capita expenditure, 
household size, total age group categories,(0-5, 6-11, 12-17, 65+)) 
 
Finally, we also examined other explanations for observed schooling impacts in analysis not 
shown here. We tested other potential schooling moderators—factors that could affect schooling 
outcomes but would not be impacted by the cash transfer program and so would not plausibly mediate the 
impact from treatment to schooling. Neither of the factors we tested, the time it takes to get school and 
whether there is a school-feeding program, has a significant effect on schooling. We also examined other 
potential mediators—household food consumption, transfer share, and child labor—and find no mediation 
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of these measures either. Finally we asked treatment households whether they believed that rules existed 
about sending children to school to receive the cash transfer. When we examine rule perception among 
treatment households at follow-up, we also find no significant effects on enrollment or dropout. 
Discussion 
In this study we show that Malawi’s unconditional cash transfer program, the SCTP, is an 
effective demand-side education intervention. The cash helps poor children to attend school by alleviating 
the financial burden of schooling for the household. Specifically, school-age children (aged 6-17) in 
treatment households are 15 percentage-points more likely to be enrolled in school and 4 percentage-
points less likely to dropout. Furthermore, examining the impacts by individual sub-groups, we find that 
impacts are very similar by gender and age. Both males and females in treatment households are 
significantly more likely to be enrolled in school over the control group and the magnitude of treatment 
effects are comparable to the full sample. Treatment effects on enrollment are also significant for both 
primary and secondary aged children and dropouts are significantly reduced for all but females. We also 
find that for those children that were not enrolled at baseline, treatment effects are even stronger (21 pp 
for enrollment and -11 pp for dropouts) implying that the cash is helping children return to school or 
permitting them to go for the first time. 
We also investigated mechanisms through which the cash may work to improve schooling 
outcomes. As the literature highlights how income affects children indirectly through parental decisions, 
our main analysis investigates mediators of parental investment and stress. In addition though, we 
examined other explanations for observed schooling impacts including channels of household food 
consumption, transfer share, and child labor. Our results indicate that impacts are entirely explained by 
parental investment in the form of increased education related spending.  
Since the cost of schooling is the biggest factor for these poor families in the decision to send 
their children to school, the cash works mainly by alleviating some of these economic constraints. Our 
results show that education spending completely mediates the direct treatment impact, but further analysis 
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shows that in particular, the cash is spent on notebooks (or other stationary) and uniforms. Out of all 
education expenditure categories, these two items are the only ones that the program significantly 
impacted, and we find that they both individually help mediate the direct treatment effects on enrollment 
and dropout. It is clear from our analysis that the income effect of the cash transfer is primarily 
responsible for the positive schooling impacts we find, parents can now afford certain schooling items for 
their children, notebooks and uniforms specifically, that help children attend school.  
While these specific purchases help explain why the cash transfer is improving school 
enrollments and dropouts, claims that these items cause the observed schooling impacts is not very 
intuitive. However, in the qualitative data1 we do find that acquisition of these items is a frequently cited 
reason for why children can attend and stay in school. For example, although officially primary education 
is free and uniforms are not compulsory, sometimes schools will not allow children to attend. Such as was 
the case for one male youth respondent,  
What really made me drop out is the lack of money to pay for what I have just told you 
but also I had no school uniform, so they sent me back from school. 
 
Additionally, youth commonly described a stigma of being without certain school items such that they 
could suffer ridicule by their classmates and teachers if they lacked them. For instance, respondents at 
baseline discussed sometimes being bullied by teachers or school administers for dirty uniforms or lack of 
supplies. Moreover, the most cited reason for missing or dropping out of school was not having the basic 
school supplies, although other reasons included competing demands on their time such as needing to do 
informal wage labor (ganyu) to support the household and for girls, taking care of children.  
The follow-up qualitative interviews also provide support to the story emerging from the 
quantitative data that the cash transfer works to improve schooling outcomes because it increases 
education expenditures on certain items. Interviews from both caregivers and youth often mention that the 
reason the cash is helping them in school is because it enables the purchase of uniforms, soap, and school 
                                                     
1Qualitative data comes from baseline and follow-up in-depth individual interviews with a caregiver and 
one youth from 16 treatment households selected using a stratified sampling approach. 
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supplies. Caregivers, in particular, frequently discussed how the money is important in sending kids to 
school with clean uniforms and school supplies. For example one caregiver says, 
We use the money to buy washing soap so that the children should put on clean clothes 
when they are going to school. I also use the money to buy learning materials like 
notebooks and pencils, sometimes the school demands a small amount of fee in which 
case we also use the money from the cash transfer program. 
 
These changes are also described as helping to facilitate the entire school experience including feeling 
socially accepted and academically engaged. The same caregiver says about one of her children, 
…[Child’s name] was not working hard in class because we didn’t have enough money to 
help her with her education. But she now works hard because we started receiving money 
from the cash transfer program. 
 
In addition, youth also explained how the program directly led to improvements in their school 
experiences. For example, one male orphan explains how the cash has made a difference since baseline, 
In the past I used to miss a lot of classes because I had no clothes. But now I have enough 
clothes, including a school uniform. I hope that I will continue with school…I had no 
hope of continuing school the last time we talked because of what was happening to me.  
 
While many youth explained how the cash is helping them or other children of the household 
attend school, in some cases, the cash was not enough to overcome the financial costs. One female simply 
states why she stopped, “Poverty is the reason, lack of clothes, and lack of soap.” Another states that he 
would like to return and admires his friends in school, but to return what he needs is, “Money…[it] would 
help me to get some of the necessary things required for school [like] school uniform, notebooks and 
pencils.” In his case, the money from the cash transfer was being used for other purposes such as food and 
caring for his disabled mother and so it was not enough to help him attend school.  
Moreover, another issue for older children is the cost differential of attending secondary school. 
In one youth’s case, he had completed primary school and started to attend secondary school but the cash 
transfer was not enough for his family to afford the increased fees and so he was sent home for not paying 
them. One last challenge that youth expressed in attending school was not the financial cost but other 
responsibilities and demands on their time. For example, although one female wanted to return to school 
after her households started receiving the cash, she did not have anyone to watch her young child.  
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Limitations 
One limitation of this study is that there are fundamental challenges in isolating the ways in 
which income affects child development outcomes. For one, these pathways are mostly unobserved and 
endogenous to the household (Strauss & Thomas, 2008; Shadish et al., 2002). Moreover, the measures we 
have of parental stress and investment are latent constructs for the true parental behaviors and thus we 
may be imprecisely measuring their impact. Finally, the causal mediation literature shows the strongest 
identification test would require randomization to mediator levels but our measures are not externally 
manipulated meaning the model may lack some predictive power (Bullock & Ha, 2011). Nevertheless, the 
strength of our study design, including the longitudinal data and randomizing economic conditions, and 
the use of non-experimental methods, means that this analysis offers reasonably strong evidence for these 
mediation results. 
Another limitation is that we are limited in testing short-term outcomes since we do not have 
measures of achievement or cognitive aptitude. The goals of the SCTP program are to increase child 
human capital and although we cannot directly test for this, evidence from Malawi shows that there are 
relatively large returns to schooling; the average Mincerian rate of return to years of schooling is 10 
percent (Chirwa & Matita, 2009). Moreover, just gaining basic literacy and numeracy skills are valuable 
for participation in economic activities throughout life. Therefore, prolonged school attendance that leads 
to grade completion is an important factor in improving children’s later-life outcomes.  
One final limitation is that expenditures on educational items are only collected for enrolled 
students. In order to better understand the impact of educational resources on schooling, we would ideally 
collect ownership of material items in addition to expenditures for all school-age children. However, 
given that our results are strong and robust across the qualitative evidence, it appears that we are 
identifying the most likely material items that are producing improved schooling outcomes. 
Conclusion 
This study provides causal evidence from Malawi’s SCTP that an unconditional social cash 
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transfer program can have strong effects on school attendance for children in beneficiary households, and 
it works by relieving some of the financial barriers of schooling. More specifically, it helps families to 
purchase uniforms, notebooks, and other school supplies. Although improving schooling and child human 
capital is an objective of the SCTP program (and many similar programs across the developing world), 
there is no obligation for families to send their children to school to receive the money. Therefore, our 
findings indicate that parents are eager to invest in their child’s education, and by helping families meet 
the costs of schooling, unconditional cash transfers can directly increase the demand for education. 
Although Malawi’s SCTP may help children enroll and stay in school, it is not clear, however, 
that this will lead to greater human capital accumulation. Malawi’s education system is stressed—there 
are not enough teachers or classrooms, schools are overcrowded and dilapidated, and facilities often lack 
proper sanitation or clean water. Even if programs are successful in increasing short-term outcomes such 
as enrollment, poor educational quality is a threat to achieving medium-term outcomes such as greater 
student achievement. Therefore, it may be that efforts to improve the demand for education through cash 
transfers will be undermined without improvements to poor-quality educational systems.  
Intuitively, we would expect that supply-side investments are important but evidence from other 
countries is ambiguous as to how they interact with cash transfers to impact both short-term and medium-
term outcomes. More evidence is needed on whether cash transfers that are accompanied by supply-side 
interventions lead to improvements in both short-term outcomes like enrollment and medium-term 
outcomes like improved educational achievement. However, even if quality improvements are gradual, 
schooling appears to be one of the most promising pathway through which cash transfers may contribute 
to the successful transition to adulthood. Recent cash transfer evidence has been showing the protective 
relationship school attendance appears to have on a number of child and adolescent development 
outcomes such as early pregnancy (Handa et al., 2015), sexual behaviors, (Baird, Garfein, McIntosh, 
Özler, 2012) and mental health (Baird, de Hoop, & Özler, 2013; Kilburn, Thirumurthy, Halpern, Pettifor, 
& Handa, 2015).  
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Overall, this study contributes to emerging evidence on the influence of social cash transfer 
programs in SSA to promote child development by targeting household poverty. Results reveal that 
within a relatively short amount of time, unconditional cash programs can improve child-schooling 
outcomes and that parents will invest resources in their children even without an explicit condition. 
Implications are that in these ultra-poor contexts where enrollments are lower than socially desired, this 
type of poverty-targeted cash transfer program could result in large, cost-effective improvements in child 
schooling and human capital. Policymakers should therefore be conscious of the potential efficacy of 
these programs to meet world development goals by increasing the demand for education.  
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CHAPTER 4: CASH TRANSFERS AND ADOLESCENT MENTAL HEALTH: CAUSAL 
EVIDENCE AND MECHANISMS 
 
Introduction 
 
Mental health problems that develop during childhood and adolescence may have significant and 
long-lasting impacts because proper psychosocial functioning is an essential factor in the developmental 
process for young people. Adolescent mental health is particularly important for a successful transition 
into adulthood because of its association with other important factors like physical health, educational 
attainment, and risky or delinquent behaviors (O'Connell, Boat, & Warner, 2009). Moreover, good mental 
may be important during adolescence because is strongly associated with positive affect (Fredrickson & 
Losada, 2005) and evidence has shown that positive affect benefits decision-making by increasing focus, 
self-discipline, and the ability to make forward-looking decisions (Isen 2008; Lyubomirsky, King, & 
Diener, 2005).  
One of the biggest influences on child and adolescent development is socio-economic status. 
Poverty during childhood can have detrimental effects on children’s mental health in addition to their 
human capital and physical health. These developmental disadvantages can accumulate and contribute to 
the persistence of poverty as they stick with individuals into adulthood (Yaqub, 2002; Harper, Marcus, & 
Moore, 2003). A sizeable literature in the developed world has found that the negative impacts of poverty 
on child development can be improve with increases in household income (Brooks-Gunn & Duncan, 
1997; Gershoff, Aber, & Raver, 2007; Mayer, 1997; McLoyd, 1998) including causal evidence from both 
natural and experimental designs (Costello, Compton, Keeler, & Angold, 2003; Morris & Gennetian, 
2003). These studies have linked increases in income to changes in parental behaviors that support 
improved child development outcomes.  
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In the developing world these relationships have not been thoroughly examined, however, 
poverty-alleviation programs that directly increase household income through cash payments present an 
opportunity to provide evidence from these settings. These social cash transfer programs (SCTs), by 
reducing poverty, may help address the burden of mental health among poor adolescents, boosting their 
chances for long-term success. Some studies have previously linked cash transfer receipt to improved 
mental health outcomes (Lund et al., 2011; Baird, de Hoop, & Özler, 2013; Kilburn, Thirumurthy, 
Halpern, Pettifor, & Handa, 2015) and globally, there is increasing evidence to suggest a protective effect 
of SCTs on young people. Notably, cash transfer programs may have the potential to reduce risky sexual 
behaviors (Baird, Chirwa, McIntosh, & Özler 2010; Heinrich, Hoddinott, & Samson, 2015; Cluver et al., 
2013) and HIV incidence in high HIV/AIDs prevalence settings (Baird, Garfein, McIntosh, & Özler, 
2012). These outcomes might even be bolstered by improvements in mental health since risky sexual 
behaviors have been linked to mental health problems in youth (DiClemente et al. 2001; Ramrakha et al., 
2000).  
Yet, despite this mounting evidence, the potential for cash transfers to improve the transition to 
adulthood remains a question. In particular, there is little understanding of how income from the cash 
transfer impacts these adolescent outcomes because cash is given at the household level and thus 
indirectly impacts adolescents through parental spending decisions. This study will help address this gap 
by analyzing the impact of a cash transfer program on adolescent mental health and some of the possible 
intervening pathways.  
In this paper, we use a randomized study of a social cash transfer program in Malawi to identify 
the causal effects of a positive income shock and mediating pathways on the mental health of adolescents 
ages 13-22. Malawi’s Social Cash Transfer Program (SCTP) is an unconditional, government-run 
program that distributes monthly cash payments to rural, ultra-poor households. Unconditional cash 
transfers distribute payments regardless of recipient behaviors, allowing households to spend money how 
they wish, whereas conditional transfers tie receipt to certain conditions (Handa, Devereux, & Webb, 
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2010). Transfers from the SCTP comprise a significant share (almost 20 percent) of baseline per capita 
consumption for the average household in our study. The households for this study were randomly 
assigned to the treatment or control arm after an initial baseline survey and a second round of data 
collection occurred after approximately twelve months of transfers were distributed to beneficiary 
households. This experimental study design allows us to estimate causal effects of the program on mental 
health and possible mediators.  
Using the short form of the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression scale (CES-D), a 
commonly used instrument to assess depression prevalence in field settings, we show that a positive 
income shock does not result in a significant reduction in depressive symptoms for most adolescents. In 
the year’s time frame of this study, adolescents in treatment households at follow-up had lower average 
CES-D scores and depression prevalence rates, but results are not significant for the full sample. However 
two subgroups, orphans and females, did experience declines in depression with significance at the 10 
percent level. We do not find strong evidence of mediation for any of the intervening pathways that we 
investigate including parental stress, investment, material well-being, schooling, or illness. School 
enrollment, however, appears to be a significant protective factor for adolescent mental health.  
Mental Health and Poverty  
Adolescent mental health is a significant global health concern as disorders comprise a major 
share of the disease burden for young people (World Health Organization, 2004) and because disorders 
put adolescents at a higher risk of mortality through their link to suicides, a leading cause of death 
amongst this age group (Prince et al., 2007). Moreover, many of the other leading contributors to the 
burden of disease in young people have mental-health dimensions. For example, chronic diseases, 
substance abuse, and violence in young people are associated with an increased risk of mental disorders. 
Mental health problems, on the other hand, can also predispose exposure to abusive environments (Patel, 
Flisher, Hetrick, & McGorry, 2007).  
Another particularly relevant issue for adolescents in Malawi and other sub-Saharan African 
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(SSA) settings is the link between mental health and HIV/AIDs. For one, young people with mental 
disorders are at a higher risk of contracting HIV/AIDS with the increased risk associated with factors such 
as low self-efficacy and exposure to peers and situations that encourage risky behaviors like unprotected 
sex (Lyon et al., 2000; Donenberg & Pao, 2005).  Reciprocally, having HIV/AIDs also puts adolescents at 
greater risk of depression. Moreover, there are mental-health consequences of having family members 
that are currently affected or were lost by the disease (Cluver, Gardner, & Operario, 2007). 
Proper psychosocial functioning also plays a fundamental role in an individual’s quality of life 
given that mental disorders are associated both with internal suffering and external issues like 
discrimination. Moreover, good mental health for adolescents is additionally significant since mental 
disorders in young people tend to persist into adulthood (Costello, Foley, and Angold, 2005; McLaughlin 
et al., 2010) and can have long-term consequences on their future well-being (McLoyd et al. 2009; Knapp 
et al., 2002). Primarily, mental health problems during adolescence can impair development across 
cognitive, economic, and social domains. For instance, evidence links child mental health problems to 
worse educational and labor market outcomes (Currie & Stabile 2006; Fletcher & Wolfe 2008; Gibb, 
Fergusson, & Horwood, 2010; Currie & Madrian, 1999), poor sexual health (DiClemente et al., 2001), as 
well as substance abuse and violence (Patel et al., 2007). Furthermore, poor mental health can also lead to 
increased risky decision-making, which has implications that can extend into adulthood as adolescents are 
making decisions related to schooling, employment, and sexual activity (Patel et al., 2007).  
The burden of mental health problems for young people is particularly heavy in low-income 
countries, a relationship that is underscored by increasing evidence that poverty and mental health are 
linked in a two-way relationship. Poverty can help to maintain or act as a catalyst for mental health 
problems through channels such as chronic stress, social exclusion, and exposure to trauma or violence. 
On the other hand, mental illness can increase the risk of poverty through reduced productivity, loss of 
employment, and increased health expenditures (Lund et al., 2011). While the evidence for this 
relationship in high-income countries is fairly robust (Patel et al., 2010), in the developing world, the 
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evidence linking poverty and mental health is inconclusive. In a recent review, Lund et al. (2011) 
examine interventions that either addressed mental health or economic well-being and find mixed 
evidence on the connection between common mental disorders and economic well-being. Interventions 
that targeted mental health had stronger impacts on economic and financial well-being than did economic 
interventions on mental health.  
On the other hand, evidence on the effect of income shocks on mental health provides some 
support for this two-way relationship. For example, natural experimental evidence from Britain and 
Sweden lottery winners give some of strongest evidence of the benefit of a positive income shock on 
mental health (Gardner & Oswald, 2007; Lindahl, 2005). Additionally though, there is growing evidence 
that cash transfers can lead to decreased stress and improved mental health in the household. Give 
Directly, an unconditional cash transfer program in Kenya that distributes large one-time payments, found 
significant impacts on psychological well-being among beneficiary adults including reduced depression 
using the full CES-D scale (Hausofer & Shapiro, 2013).  A couple of recent studies have also found 
improvements in adolescent mental health outcomes. Baird, de Hoop, and Özler (2013), for one, find 
evidence for improved psychosocial health from a pilot RCT in Malawi that randomized schoolgirls to 
receive a monthly cash transfer, which included both a conditional and unconditional arm. Significant 
mental health effects, measured with the GHQ-12, were found for both treatment arms while the program 
was ongoing, but the effect dissipated after the transfers stopped. Additionally, Kilburn et al. (2015) find 
that a national, unconditional cash transfer program in Kenya, the CT-OVC, had a significant, positive 
impact on young people’s mental health 4 years after the program began.  
Neither of these studies, however, collected baseline data on mental health. This paper therefore 
improves upon the current literature by including baseline levels of mental health and following up after a 
year. However, we note that the scope of SCTP program to impact depressive disorders after a year are 
mostly likely limited to those which are temporary in nature and affected by environmental factors as the 
opposed to full scope of disorders that have greater biological associations and are longer in duration 
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(Deater-Deckard et al., 1997).  
Pathways of Influence 
In addition to providing evidence on the relationship between poverty alleviation and mental 
health by asking whether a cash transfer program can decrease adolescent depression, another important 
question is, how might this income work to benefit adolescents? In the case of the Malawi SCTP and 
other similar programs in SSA that distribute unconditional cash, this is especially important since it is up 
to households to decide how to spend the money. In this paper, we therefore investigate a few pathways 
through which the SCTP could impact adolescents in order to better understand the relationship between 
poverty alleviation and adolescent mental health in this setting. 
Conceptually, there are a number of channels that the cash transfer may operate through to 
influence adolescent mental health. Firstly, there is abundant evidence that cash transfers help improve 
household welfare by decreasing poverty and managing economic shocks including evidence from the 
Malawi SCTP (Miller, Tsoka, Reichert, 2008; Malawi SCTP Evaluation Team, 2015). In particular, the 
cash is often used to increase household food consumption, nutrition, and spending on health care (Adato 
& Basset, 2009). Thus, the cash may work to improve adolescent mental health through improvements in 
their health status since physical and psychosocial health are strongly linked to each other (Patel et al., 
2007). Secondly, improved economic situations may also increase resource allocation to children such as 
spending on items to improve their material well-being. In Malawi, the SCTP has helped improve child 
material well-being through purchase of personal consumption items including shoes, clothing, and 
hygiene products. These items may improve self-esteem, especially given the stigma reported in 
qualitative interviews of going to school without shoes or clean uniforms (Malawi SCTP Evaluation 
Team, 2015). A third potential channel is through increased school enrollment and attendance as evidence 
from both unconditional and conditional programs has shown positive impacts of cash transfers on 
adolescent schooling (Baird, Ferreira, Özler, & Woolcock, 2013). School attendance may be protective of 
adolescent psychosocial well-being in part because it is associated with improved self-esteem (Heckman, 
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Stixrud, & Urzua, 2006) but additionally, it may decrease exposure to risky environments given the time 
commitment of school and higher quality, focused peers.  
Although these channels may help explain the ways cash can improve adolescent mental health, 
parental behaviors serve as the foundation of these channels because parents play the primary role in 
resource allocation and household decisions related to schooling and work for adolescents. A robust 
literature on mediation between income and child development has proposed a number of behaviors 
including parental psychological well-being, investment of money or time in children, and aspects of 
parenting behavior such as harsh discipline or affection (Conger & Elder, 1994; Haveman & Wolfe, 1995; 
Mayer, 1997). Two of these pathways are examined in this study, parental ability to invest resources in 
their children and parental psychological well-being in terms of their stress levels.  
The parental investment model focuses on the economic effect of income to enable the purchase 
of resources for child investment (Becker, 1991; Becker & Tomes, 1994). In this model, poverty affects 
parental behavior by limiting parents' ability to invest money and time in their children, lowering 
children’s exposure to materials and experiences that would benefit their development. Empirical results 
have shown that this behavior is a pathway between income and child development but primarily for 
cognitive outcomes and has less of an effect on socio-emotional outcomes (Guo & Harris, 2000; Linver, 
Brooks-Gunn, & Kohen, 2002; Yeung, Linver, & Brooks-Gunn, 2002). The second pathway of 
mediation, the parental stress model, focuses on how economic hardships such as low income contribute 
to stress and emotional instability (Conger & Elder, 1994). These states are associated with harsher and 
less supportive parenting, which then leads to negative developmental consequences for children. 
Empirical work has confirmed these relationships, particularly for child social and emotional behaviors 
(Guo & Harris, 2000; Yeung et al., 2002, Gershoff et al., 2007).  
Families living in extreme poverty are important in understanding these relationships because 
more than other households they tend to experience chronic stressors and negative shocks that can place 
them under severe financial strain (Adato & Bassett, 2009). Furthermore, in SSA, HIV-affected 
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households are particularly stressed, research showing the disease is associated with increased poverty 
(Gillies, Tolley, & Wolstenholme, 1996), caregiver depression (Lachman et al., 2013; Littrell et al., 
2012), increased child behavior problems (Sipsma et al., 2013), and lack of social support both 
emotionally (Casale & Wild, 2012) and financially (Heymann & Kidman, 2009).  
If the cash helps to improve household economic conditions, this will strengthen the capacity of 
parents to provide better care for their children and could subsequently improve parenting decisions. If 
parents start to spend more on items that improve adolescent well-being such as nutritious foods, 
education, or health care, this may positively impact mental health. Moreover, increased household 
income may improve mental health among adolescents as reduced financial stress among parents can 
decrease adverse moods and improve relationships.  
This paper will examine the effect of the SCTP on these two parental pathways and whether they 
help mediate any impact on adolescent mental health. These parental pathways should account for several 
of the proposed mediation channels, however, some of these channels may have additional direct impacts 
not explained by parental behavior. Consequently, we also examine individual adolescent variables 
including health and schooling. Furthermore, individual and household characteristics may modify the 
impacts of the cash transfer on either depression or pathways. In particular, gender could be an important 
modifier since most common mental disorders have a characteristic gender divide such that young women 
are 1.5–3 times more likely to have depressive disorders (Patel et al., 2007). Other important 
characteristics include being an orphan since losing a parent puts young people at greater risk of 
depression (Pao et al., 2000) and depth of poverty given the greater marginal impact the income from the 
cash transfer could have for the neediest households.  
Measures 
Mental Health Instrument 
Adolescent mental health is measured using the CES-D10, a 10-question short version of the 20-
question Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression (CES-D) test that measures depressive symptoms 
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for individuals (Radloff, 1977; Andresen, Malmgren, Carter, & Patrick, 1984). The short form is not a 
diagnostic tool but is used to measure the current level of depressive symptoms by focusing on the 
affective component of depressed mood. The CES-D10 has been validated across a variety of 
geographical contexts and demographics (Andresen et al., 1984) and is known to have good internal 
consistency. 
The CES-D10 contains ten items answered on a one to five Likert scale (listed in Appendix Table 
B1). Questions ask how often certain feelings or behaviors occurred in the past seven days, responses 
include “Rarely” (<1 day), “Some or a little of the time” (1-2 days), “Occasionally or a moderate amount 
of time” (3-4 days), “Most or all of the time” (5-7 days). Responses receive a score from one (rarely) to 
four (most of the time) and higher scores reflect more depressive symptoms. Scores are summed across 
all questions to create a scale where higher scores reflect more depressive symptoms. The scale has high 
internal validity across both waves with a Cronbach Alpha score of 0.73. The scale is adjusted down to a 
base of zero (range of 0-30) and scores of 10 or higher are classified as displaying depressive symptoms. 
This cutoff has been used in previous studies in SSA settings (Asante & Andoh-Arthur, 2015; Othieno et 
al., 2014; Kilburn et al., 2015), but this cutoff has not been validated in Malawi and we did not validate 
this threshold with psychiatric interviews. Therefore, we examine the robustness of our findings by 
examining the program impact using other cut-offs and the continuous CES-D scale scores. 
Mechanisms  
Parental stress is measured using the four-item shortened version of the Perceived Stress Scale 
(Cohen, Kamarack, & Mermelstein, 1983; Cohen & Williamson, 1988). The Perceived Stress Scale (PSS) 
is the most widely used psychological instrument for measuring the perception of stress. The scale intends 
to measure the degree to which situations in one’s life are considered stressful. The PSS asks respondents 
to rate how often over the past month they had certain feelings that tap into how uncontrollable and 
overloaded respondents find their lives. Responses are given on a one to five Likert scale from whether 
they “never” or “always” feel that way. Items are summed to develop a scale with a range of 4-20. In the 
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follow-up survey, the full 10-item PSS scale was included. To test the 4-item scale for robustness, we 
compare the scores for the control group across these two scales. The Cronbach Alpha score of the 4-item 
PSS is 0.63 and 0.74 for the full scale; the correlation between the two scales is 0.78. 
Parental investment is measured using child specific spending and individual ownership of certain 
items. Included in the household survey was an extensive expenditure module that captured household 
expenditures on child clothing, and individual expenditures on education and health. Additionally, for 
children 5 to 18, we collected data on whether the child owns certain material items—shoes, two sets of 
clothes, blanket. We create two index measures of investment with these variables. The first, child 
specific expenditures, measures whether the household spent any money on child education, health, and 
clothing. The second, child’s material well-being, is a summation of whether a child owns shoes, two sets 
of clothes, and a blanket. Therefore, both indices range from 0-3 with higher scores representing greater 
investment in the child. We test each measure of investment (individual expenditure and material items) 
and each index for program impacts.  
The Malawi SCTP 
The Government of Malawi’s (GoM’s) Social Cash Transfer Program (SCTP) is an unconditional 
cash transfer program targeted to ultra-poor, labor constrained households. SCTP beneficiary selection is 
made through a community-based approach with oversight provided by local and national government. 
Ultra-poor households are unable to take care of members’ most basic needs including food and essential 
non-food items such as clothing. Labor constrained households have more dependent members than wage 
earners or those able to work. Household members are dependent if they are below 18 or above 64 years 
old, or if they are between age 18 and 64 but have any illness, disability, or other condition making them 
unable to work (Malawi SCTP Evaluation Team, 2014).  
An early evaluation of the Malawi SCTP in Mchinji confirms that recipient households live in 
extreme poverty and have higher dependency ratios than other poor households (Miller, Tsoka, & 
Reichert, 2010). Additionally, household heads tend to be older (above 60) and upwards of 80% of 
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households are missing at least one prime-age adult, highlighting their particular vulnerability to the 
impacts of HIV/AIDS (Malawi SCTP Evaluation Team, 2013).  
The monthly transfer provided by the SCTP varies in size depending upon the number and school 
status of members in the household. Table 4.1 shows transfer amounts in Malawi Kwacha (MWK) that 
were in use at time of follow-up data collection. The average cash transfer amounts to around $8 per 
month.  
Table 4.1. Structure and level of transfers   
 Transfer Size (MWK) 
1 Member  1,000  
2 Members  1,500  
3 Members  1,950  
4+ Members  2,400  
Each primary school child1  300  
Each secondary school member2  600  
Source: Malawi Social Cash Transfer Program Midline Impact Evaluation Report (2015) 
 
The transfer size as a share of pre-program household consumption is an important factor to 
consider when assessing program effects with 20 percent being the proposed ‘rule of thumb’ in order to 
have measurable impacts (Davis & Handa, 2015). The average transfer share in our sample was 18 
percent at follow-up, however, beginning in May 2015 transfer amounts were increased so that majority 
would meet or exceed this 20 percent threshold. 
Research design and sampling 
The impact evaluation of Malawi’s SCTP study uses a cluster-randomized longitudinal design. 
The evaluation was designed around the GoM’s plans to expand coverage of the SCTP across Malawi 
over three years starting in 2013. In order to integrate the impact evaluation with early expansion plans in 
2013, two districts, Salima and Mangochi, were chosen for this study. Random selection was included at 
all possible levels within these districts including Traditional Authorities (TAs) and Village Clusters 
(VCs). Since the program did not have the financial resources to reach all households immediately, the 
study design is both administrative feasible and ethically defensible. This study has IRB approval from 
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both the University of North Carolina (IRB Study No. 14-1933) and Malawi’s National Commission for 
Science and Technology (IRB Study No. RTT/2/20). 
In the first stage, two TAs in each district were randomly selected to participate in the evaluation 
study then for each VC within these four TAs, eligible beneficiary lists were generated following official 
program targeting procedures. In the second stage, VCs were randomly selected to arrive at a necessary 
sample size of 3,500 based on power calculations for key program outcomes. The final sample for the 
study was drawn from 29 VCs and includes 3,531 households, approximately 47 percent of all eligible 
households from the four TAs. The baseline survey was then administered over several months from June 
to September 2013 to this sample. Households were not assigned to treatment (T) and control (C) status 
until the baseline survey concluded in order to maintain objectivity during data collection. Half of the 
VCs in each TA were randomly assigned to the treatment group and the other half of the VCs was 
assigned to the delayed-entry control group. The 1,678 treatment households started receiving the cash 
transfer right away while the 1,853 control households entered program at a later date. This cluster 
randomization approach both helps to minimize spillover effects and is considered one of the strongest 
approaches in evaluation literature with elements of random selection and assignment (Malawi SCTP 
Evaluation Team, 2013; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).  
The follow-up survey occurred at the end of 2014. The study retained 95 percent of the baseline 
sample and detailed attrition analysis finds no evidence of selective attrition. At the time of follow-up 
data collection, treatment households had received five or six cash payments equivalent to about a year’s 
worth of transfers since each accounted for two months (Malawi SCTP Evaluation Team, 2015). 
Adolescent Sampling and Surveys 
This study uses data from both household and adolescent surveys. The household survey is the 
main survey instrument and collects information on demographics, food and non-food expenditures, 
productive activity, education, and health, among others. The Young Person’s module was administered 
to adolescents aged 13-19 (baseline) and 14-22 (follow-up) currently living in the household and collected 
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information on outcomes such as psychosocial well-being, risky sexual behaviors, substance use, and 
social support. Up to three adolescents per household were interviewed and the youngest three were 
prioritized if a household had more than three eligible members. Among the adolescent population within 
the target age range, approximately 76 percent of the total possible adolescents were interviewed in both 
waves. Since this represents a select sample within the total household, we include weights to account for 
the probability of being interviewed. Our analysis uses the sample of adolescents who were interviewed in 
both waves resulting in a sample size of 1,332 in each wave. 
Due to the sensitive nature of the questions, individuals were interviewed in private by same sex 
interviewers. Informed consent was obtained from parents of adolescents ages 17 and under, and these 
individuals also gave their assent. For adolescents ages 18 and above, informed consent was obtained 
directly from the individual.  
Randomization and Summary Statistics 
Table 4.2. Baseline randomization balance in key program indicators 
  Panel 
 Full sample T C 
Observations 3,531 1,608 1,761 
Poverty and Food Security    
Poverty rate, individuals (%) 85.2  90.3 92.8 
Eat only one meal per day (%) 19.3 21.3 19.1 
Economic Activity     
Operate an enterprise (%) 23.1 24.1 22.6 
Cultivate land (%) 95.2 95.6 96.0 
Selling any crops (%) 22.7 21.6 23.9 
Adult Health (age 50+)    
Morbidity  (%) 53.2 55.9 49.9 
Any disability (%) 58.6 13.9 14.9 
Schooling & Labor     
Ganyu work for pay (age 10-17) 40.8 41.1 38.9 
School enrollment (14–17)   70.5 64.3 71.3 
Young Child Health & Nutrition    
Underweight (age 0-5) 17.6 19.3 16.9 
Consumed Vit A rich foods previous day (6-59 months) 67.0 67.4 60.9 
Data source: Table 5.1.1 from Malawi SCTP Baseline Report, 2014 
 
The main objectives of the program are to increase decrease poverty and hunger and increase 
child human capital. Therefore we tested primary outcomes aligned with these goals including 
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consumption, food security, economic productivity, schooling, and health and nutrition of young children. 
Table 4.2 shows summary statistics of some of these primary outcomes at baseline. We tested for 
statistical differences between the two treatment arms using OLS regression and accounting for the survey 
design to adjust standard errors. Table 4.2 shows that randomization was successful in all key program 
outcomes for the panel of households interviewed in both waves as the treatment and comparison groups 
are balanced across these variables (p-value<0.1).  
Table 3. Baseline randomization in outcomes and control variables 
 Household Panel 
 T C 
Observations 1,608 1,761 
Household Characteristics    
Per Capita Consumption (mean annual MWK) 43,891 41,357 
Household size (mean) 4.5 4.5 
Number of shocks in past 12 months (mean) 2.5 2.5 
Age of head (mean) 58.7 56.8 
Female head (%) 83.2 84.8 
Head has chronic illness (%) 47.2 40.5 
Head ever attended school (%) 27.8 30.4 
  
Adolescent Panel (13-19)* 
 T C 
Observations 676 656 
Individual Characteristics, Mediators, and Outcomes    
Male (%) 53.8 50.1 
Age (mean) 15.3 (1.8) 15.2 (1.7) 
Orphan (under 18) (%) 46.4 43.4 
Enrolled in school (%) 68.5 75.3 
Ever had sex (%) 31.8 26.8 
Illness past 2 weeks (%) 19.6 16.8 
Perceived Stress Scale (range of 4-20) (mean) 14.8 (3.2) 15.0 (3.4) 
Child investment spending index (range of 1-3) (mean) 1.0 (0.7) 1.0 (0.7) 
Any education spending (%) 66.6 68.5 
Any health spending (%) 15.8 15.1 
Any clothing spending (%) 14.8 18.3 
18 and under   
Number of child well-being items (range of 1-3) (mean) 1.5 (0.9) 1.5 (1.0) 
Extra set of clothing (%) 82.5 79.6 
Shoes (%) 30.1 32.1 
Blanket (%) 40.0 41.4 
Depressed (%) 43.7 47.5 
Depressed male (%) 39.3 45.9 
Depressed female (%) 48.9 49.2 
CES-D score (mean) 9.6 (5.5) 10.2 (5.5) 
*Adolescent panel is the sample of adolescents interviewed in both waves  
  
 93
 
We also tested for baseline balance amongst all outcome and control variables used in this study 
including variables that the literature suggests may be correlated with mental health. The top panel of 
Table 4.3 displays summary data of household-level characteristics at baseline and we find no significant 
differences between treatment arms (p-value<0.1). The summary data shows that households in our 
sample tend to have older, female heads and an average size of 4.5 members. In the bottom panel, we 
display summary data for individual characteristics, mediators, and outcomes and also find that there is 
good balance between T and C adolescents. Summary baseline data show our adolescent sample has an 
average age of 15, slightly less than half are orphans, and upwards of two-thirds are enrolled in school.  
Estimation Strategy 
Specification 
With respect to the randomized design of this study, we analyze the average treatment effect 
(ATE) of the intervention on mental health outcomes using Wave 2 cross-section data. The regression 
adjusted ATE program impact on mental health is estimated with the following equation:  
(1)  
In Equation 1, Yi is an outcome measure for mental health, Ti is an indicator for treatment status, Xi2 is the 
set of individual wave 2 controls while Xi1 is the set of baseline covariates. We use OLS regression for 
our CES-D measure and a logit model for our depression indicator and report marginal effects. 
To take advantage of the panel data and account for external time trends, we also employ a 
Differences-in-Differences (DD) model. Equation 2 shows the basic empirical specification where T*P is 
the DD estimate of the treatment effect, and includes indicators for treatment status (Ti) and second time 
period (Pt), Xit is the set of time varying control variables while Xi1 is the vector of baseline covariates. 
(2)  
 The error terms (eit) are clustered at the VC level to account for the clustering at the level 
randomization to treatment. Probability sampling weights for adolescents are used to make the results 
representative of the target population in the study area. 
 
Yi = α +γTi + β1Xi2 + β2 Xii1 + ei
Yit = α +δ(Ti * Pt )+γTi + λPt + β1Xiti + β2Xii1 + eit
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 In all regressions described above, individual controls include age and sex as well as baseline 
values of the following variables: being an orphan (for those 18 and under), morbidity in the two weeks 
prior to the interview, and ever having had sex. These variables were chosen because they are predictive 
of mental health and thus improve the precision of the impact estimates. We also use controls for other 
variables that would contribute to parenting behaviors and decision-making including baseline values of 
the household head’s sex, age, and education, as well as household characteristics including household 
size, total members in different age groups, consumption, and a district dummy for living in Salima.  
Mediation 
While randomized experiments in social sciences are esteemed for their ability to provide causal 
estimates of treatment effects, one common criticism is that they do not provide an explanation for why 
an effect is observed. The identification of causal mechanisms, however, can improve our understanding 
of these relationships, which may improve policy design. Mediation analysis helps to identify these causal 
mechanisms (mediators) that lie in the causal pathway between the treatment and the outcome.  
In this analysis, we estimate the impact of proposed pathways through the causal steps method 
proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986). This approach focuses on establishing the necessary conditions for 
mediation to occur and validates the impact of mediating pathways by testing a sequence of logical 
relations between X, Y, and M as shown in Figure 1. The equations in Figure 1 are modified for 
longitudinal analysis from Baron and Kenny’s causal steps for mediation analysis (MacKinnon et al., 
2002). Each meditational pathway is estimated separately and includes indicators for treatment, time, and 
the set of X covariates as displayed in Equation 2.  
Three conclusions are necessary (Baron & Kenny, 1986): 
1) Treatment significantly affects the outcome variable (δ)  
2) Treatment significantly affects the mediator (γ)  
3) When controlling for the mediator in the outcome model, the previous treatment effect 
is notably diminished with the strongest evidence of mediation occurring when δ’ is 
  
 95
significantly indistinguishable from zero  
Figure 4.1. Path diagram and equations for mediation 
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The strength of this approach is that in the context of a single randomized experiment it provides 
evidence that the treatment causes the outcome variable, treatment causes the mediating variable, and that 
the data are consistent with the proposed mediating variable. On the other hand, the Baron-Kenny causal 
steps do have some limitations. They do not give a direct estimate of the size of indirect effect of T with 
standard errors to perform significance tests, nor do they provide a joint test of these three conditions 
(MacKinnon et al., 2002). In this study, we use the causal steps in order to establish the necessary 
conditions for mediation with the caveat that we are not precisely identifying the indirect impact. This 
method is used in a number of similar papers that examine how cash transfers operate through mediating 
variables (Ozer et al., 2011; Baird et al., 2013; Handa et al., 2015).   
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Results 
In this paper, we keep the panel of adolescents that were interviewed in both rounds. Since this 
subsample is part of a larger panel of adolescents (those in the household survey at both waves but only 
interviewed in one round), we show in Appendix Table B2 that our sample panel is almost identical in 
observed outcome and control variables.  
Table 4.4. Wave 2 summary statistics  
 T C 
Mental Health Outcomes   
CES-D10 score (mean) 9.2 (5.1) 10.6 (5.4) 
Depressed (CES-D10>=10) (%) 43.6 55.2 
Depressed male (%) 46.7 49.0 
Depressed female (%) 39.9 61.3 
Pathways   
Stress scale (range of 4-20) (mean) 12.7 (3.2) 14.1 (3.0) 
Child investment spending index (range of 1-3) (mean) 1.3 (0.8) 0.8 (0.7) 
Any education spending (%) 68.6 53.8 
Any health spending (%) 14.1 10.0 
Any clothing spending (%) 44.6 18.4 
 (18 and under)    
Number of child material items (range of 1-3) (mean) 2.2 (0.9) 1.8 (1.0) 
Extra set of clothing (%) 94.4 90.8 
Shoes (%) 60.9 46.2 
Blanket (%) 62.6 46.0 
Enrolled in school (%) 69.2 55.8 
Illness past 2 weeks (%) 13.5 11.7 
Observations 676 656 
 Notes: Significant differences between baseline T and C groups in bold (p-value<0.1) 
At baseline (Table 4.3), adolescents in beneficiary households had an average CES-D score of 
19.6 and 44 percent were above the threshold (CES-D>=10) for displaying depressive symptoms. From 
here on, we refer to being above the cutoff as ‘depression’ but still mean symptomatology and not clinical 
diagnosis. At follow-up in Table 4.4, we find the prevalence of depression for the treatment group is the 
same, but there is a 7-percentage point (pp) increase in depression in control households (rising from 48 
to 55 percent). Separating males and females, the cash transfer appears to be more protective for female 
mental health over their male counterparts. At follow-up, 43 percent of treatment females are depressed 
compared to a much large 60 percent of control females. On the other hand, treatment males at follow-up 
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are more likely to be depressed than at baseline (7 pp increase) and have similar depression rates to than 
control males (T: 45 %, C: 47 %). 
Wave 2 summary results in Table 4.4 also show that parental stress was lower and child 
investment was higher for the treatment group at follow-up. Parents of the treatment adolescents score an 
average of 12.7 on the Perceived Stress Scale (range of 4-20) compared to a score of 14.1 for parents of 
control adolescents. Treatment adolescents are more likely to have had money spent on them at follow-up 
in each child specific spending category (education, health, and clothing). Moreover, for adolescents 18 
and under, the treatment group is more likely to have shoes, an extra set of clothing, and a blanket. 
Empirical analysis 
First, we run logit regressions on baseline data to identify determinants of depression within our 
sample. In Table 4.5, Column 1 is the unadjusted impact, Column 2 includes individual covariates, and 
Column 3 includes individual and household covariates. Consistent with successful randomization, 
treatment is insignificant in all three regressions. Except for school enrollment in the second model and 
male in the third model, we find both individual and household characteristics do a poor job of predicting 
adolescent depression. In the following regressions, we use the full list of baseline individual and 
household controls to improve precision of our estimates but only display program impacts to provide 
concise tables.  
Table 4.5. Determinants of depression (CES-D>=10) using baseline data 
 Full Adolescent Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Age Dummies 
 
   
Age 14  -0.00 0.01 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
Age 15  0.03 0.04 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
Age 16  0.06 0.08 
  (0.06) (0.06) 
Age 17  0.04 0.05 
  (0.06) (0.06) 
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Age 18  0.03 0.07 
  (0.05) (0.05) 
Age 19  0.03 0.05 
  (0.07) (0.07) 
Male  -0.06 -0.06 
  (0.04) (0.04)* 
Enrolled in school  -0.07 -0.06 
  (0.04)* (0.04) 
Ever had sex  -0.02 -0.01 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
Past 2 weeks, suffered from illness or injury  0.05 0.04 
  (0.05) (0.05) 
Orphan  0.01 0.01 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
Head went to school   0.04 
   (0.05) 
Head can read   -0.08 
   (0.06) 
Head female   -0.03 
   (0.05) 
Head age   0.00 
   (0.00) 
Head widow   -0.01 
   (0.03) 
Salima   0.05 
   (0.05) 
Total members 6 to 11   0.01 
   (0.02) 
Total members 12 to 17   -0.02 
   (0.02) 
Total members 18 to 64   -0.04 
   (0.02) 
Total members 65+   -0.04 
   (0.03) 
Household size   0.01 
   (0.02) 
Baseline log per capita expenditure   -0.02 
   (0.03) 
N 1,330 1,324 1,320 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
Table 4.6 shows the wave 2 cross-sectional (CS) and differences-in-differences (DD) regression 
results on mental health using both our indicator for depression (CES-D>=10) and the CES-D score 
(range 0-30) as dependent variables. Columns 1 and 3 show that using Wave 2 single-differences, the 
SCTP has a positive impact (negative program effect) on both depression and the CES-D score. The cash 
transfer reduces the prevalence of depression among treatment adolescents by 11-percentage points and 
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lowers the average CES-D score by 1.4 points, an impact of 0.25 standard deviations. In Columns 2 and 
4, using panel data and a DD specification, we also find that the program reduces depression and CES-D 
scores but impacts are smaller and no longer significant.  
Table 4.6. Impact of Malawi SCTP on binary measure of depression and CES-D score (T effect on 
Y) 
 Depressed (CES-D>=10) CES-D score 
 CS  
(1) 
DD   
(2) 
CS  
(3) 
DD 
 (4) 
Treatment -0.10 -0.07 -1.36 -0.73 
 (0.05)** (0.08) (0.50)** (0.82) 
N 1,318 2,638 1,318 2,638 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
Individual controls: age dummies, male, baseline: enrolled, ever had sex, morbidity past 2 weeks, orphan; Household baseline 
characteristics (head—female, age, age squared, ever attended school, chronic illness, married) (log per capita expenditure, 
household size, total age group categories (0-5, 6-11, 12-17, 65+)) 
 
Since the cutoff we use to define depression, CES-D>=10, has not been validated amongst 
adolescents in Malawi we also explore additional cutoffs at 8, 9, 11, and 12. We repeated the DD analysis 
presented in Table 4.6 using these other threshold scores (results shown in Appendix Table B3). For each 
cutoff score, the program impact is similar in size and insignificant. We therefore conclude that the 
program impacts presented in Table 6 are robust to our choice threshold used to define our binary 
indicator of depression. 
We also ran additional subgroup analysis for characteristics (gender, living in the poorest 
households, and orphan status) that we argue could make adolescents more vulnerable to mental health 
problems or to the impact of an income shock to the household.  
Table 4.7. Impact of Malawi SCTP on depression by subgroups (T effect on Y) 
 Male Female  Poorest 50% baseline Orphans 
 CS 
(1) 
DD 
(2) 
CS 
(3) 
DD 
(4) 
CS 
(5) 
DD 
(6) 
CS 
(7) 
DD 
(8) 
Treatment -0.03 0.06 -0.20 -0.21 -0.09 -0.03 -0.16 -0.14 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)*** (0.12)* (0.06) (0.09) (0.04)*** (0.08)* 
N 698 1,398 620 1,240 768 1,539 477 1,049 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
Individual controls: age dummies, male, baseline: enrolled, ever had sex, morbidity past 2 weeks, orphan / Household baseline 
characteristics (head—female, age, age squared, ever attended school, chronic illness, married) (log per capita expenditure, 
household size, total age group categories,(0-5, 6-11, 12-17, 65+)) 
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The CS and DD results in Table 4.7 show that the SCTP has differential impacts on each 
subsample and appears to be primarily protective for females and orphans. From the CS results in 
Columns 3 and 7, we find that female adolescents in the treatment group are 20 percentage points less 
likely to be depressed while orphans are 16 percentage points less likely, both significant at the 1 percent 
level. Compared to the CS results, the DD estimates in Columns 4 and 8 are similar in magnitude for 
females and orphans respectively but less significant (p-value<0.1).  
Mediation 
Earlier, we discussed the role of income to impact adolescent mental health and the potential 
mechanisms that a cash transfer program might work through to affect adolescent mental health. We 
identified two main parental channels—increased investment in adolescents and reductions in parental 
stress. We operationalize these channels with the PSS score for parental stress and an index measures for 
investment that was detailed earlier in the description of our measures. We also identified three 
individual-level channels including material well-being, schooling, and improved physical health. 
Measures for these channels include indicators for personal consumption items (extra set of clothes, 
shoes, and a blanket), spending categories (education, clothing, and health), school enrollment, highest 
grade achieved, and morbidity in the past 2 weeks. 
For each mediator, we first test the causal impact of the cash transfer (T) on the indicator or index 
measure (M) using the mediator regression defined in the Methods section. In Table 4.8, we show the 
effect of T on M for both females and orphans since the program significantly impacted these two groups. 
We also include the full sample in Table 4.8 in order to compare the treatment impacts for these 
subgroups and address how the cash might have affected these groups differently. In the ensuing analysis, 
we leave out the full sample because the first condition of causal mediation analysis (T significantly 
impacts Y) was not met.  
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Table 4.8. Impact of Malawi SCTP on mediators using DD (T effect on M) 
 Full Sample Females Orphans 
Stress Scale (4-20) -1.13 -1.14 -1.53 
 (0.62)* (0.62)* (0.80)* 
Number of items (1-3) 0.35 0.22 0.34 
 (0.15)** (0.16) (0.19)* 
Extra set clothes 0.01 -0.04 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Shoes 0.17 0.11 0.16 
 (0.05)*** (0.07) (0.09)* 
Blanket 0.18 0.17 0.18 
 (0.07)** (0.07)** (0.08)** 
Investment (1-3) 0.49 0.37 0.60 
 (0.09)*** (0.10)*** (0.10)*** 
Any education expenditure 0.16 0.12 0.22 
 (0.04)*** (0.04)** (0.05)*** 
Any health expenditure 0.04 -0.02 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
Any child clothing expenditure 0.29 0.27 0.32 
 (0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** 
Enrolled 0.19 0.15 0.25 
 (0.03)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** 
Highest grade achieved 0.30 0.19 0.68 
 (0.16)* (0.22) (0.20)*** 
Illness past 2 weeks -0.01 -0.07 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
N 2,643 1,242 1.051 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
Individual controls: age, male, baseline: enrolled, ever had sex, morbidity past 2 weeks, orphan 
Baseline controls: Head characteristics (female, age, age squared, ever attended school, chronic illness, married;) 
 Household characteristics (Baseline values of log per capita expenditure, household size, total age group categories,(0-5, 6-11, 
12-17, 65+)) 
 
Results in Table 4.8 indicate that the cash transfer has strong impacts on many of these 
meditation channels across each sample. For one, parental stress was significantly lowered for each 
sample by over a point (around 0.3 SD) on the PSS scale (p-value<0.1). The strongest results of treatment 
are on the investment channels and schooling. The program results in an increase in adolescent ownership 
of blankets, spending on child clothing and education, investment (number of child specific spending 
items), and school enrollment. We find that impacts of the cash transfer are moderated in part by the 
female and orphan samples. In general, we observe smaller impacts for females but larger ones for 
orphans compared to the full sample. For example, school enrollment impacts are significant and sizeable 
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for all groups, but females are less likely to be enrolled than the full sample (15 pp. vs. 19 pp. 
respectively), while orphans are 25 percentage points more likely to be enrolled. Additionally, the impact 
on the investment index, which sums spending items on child clothing, education and health care, is 
smallest for females and largest for orphans. In contrast, the cash transfer does not affect adolescent 
ownership of an extra set of clothes, health spending, or whether adolescents were ill in the past 2 weeks. 
These findings indicate that the program had a strong effect on channels that might influence mental 
health among adolescents. Furthermore, the observed effects are in the expected directions: the cash 
transfer improves parental stress, increases spending on adolescents, ownership of personal items, and 
school enrollment.  
Finally, to estimate the overall mediation effect of these channels (T effect on Y through M), we 
follow the steps for causal mediation and re-estimate the regressions presented in Columns 4 and 8 in 
Table 4.7, but this time also include the values of potential mediation channels. To satisfy the second 
condition of causal mediation, we continue analysis only for those mediators that were significantly 
impacted by treatment in both groups. Consequently, each channel except physical health is represented 
in the measures that we analyze for a mediation impact: Parental Stress Scale, the investment index, 
material well-being index, and school enrollment. Although blanket ownership and spending on clothing 
and education are significant, they are encompassed within the indexes. 
In order to justify casual mediation we must also uphold sequential ignorability, which consists of 
two assumptions: (1) treatment must be independent of both potential values of outcome and mediating 
variables (2) the mediator is independent of all potential values of the outcome conditioned on the 
observed treatment and pretreatment covariates (Imani, Keele, and Tingely, 2010). The first part of 
sequential ignorability is effectively taken care of with randomization to treatment, but the second part 
implies that mediators must be regarded as “as-if” randomized among treatment arms (Keele et al., 2015). 
To satisfy this second part of this assumption, we must control for all pretreatment covariates that may 
confound the relationship between the mediators and mental health so that the outcome is modeled as a 
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function of the mediator, treatment, and pretreatment covariates. Our rich baseline data allows us to 
control for pretreatment covariates we believe to impact mental health and mediators, but also allows us 
to condition on the pretreatment levels of each mediator. Each model in Table 4.9 includes baseline 
values of the mediator tested in the model and the covariates that may lie on the causal pathway. 
Assuming that the true relationship between these channels and depression is modeled correctly, 
our mediators pick up the indirect effects of the cash, while the effects remaining in the treatment 
dummies are the direct effects of the cash transfer. Table 4.9 presents the results for each of the main 
channels separately and the Column 5 and 10 show the results for all channels together.  
A similar pattern emerges for females and orphans in Table 4.9. The size of the treatment effect 
on depression is robust across all mediation measures, but for most models, it is no longer significant, 
indicating slight mediation. For a couple of channels though, parental stress (Columns 1 and 6) and 
investment for orphans (Column 8), there is no meditation since the treatment effect is both unaffected 
and significant. Other results indicate that school enrollment is an important protective channel of mental 
health as the impact on enrollment in Columns 8 and 12 is negative and significant. The effect is 
particularly strong for females; enrollment reduces depression prevalence by 17 pp (p-value<0.01). 
Finally, we include all mediators as regressors in Columns 5 and 10. There is little combined 
effect of these channels on depression. For orphans, the treatment effect is mediated to a greater extent 
than in any single mediation model, but for females, the effect size is unchanged. Nevertheless, school 
enrollment is still a strongly protective channel for both females and orphans depression.  
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Table 4.9. Impact of cash transfer with the inclusion of mediators (DD) (T effect on Y accounting for M) 
 Females   Orphans  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Treatment -0.22 -0.20 -0.20 -0.19 -0.19 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.08 
 (0.12)* (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.08)* (0.07) (0.08)* (0.07) (0.08) 
Stress scale -0.00    -0.00 0.01    0.01 
 (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) 
Number of personal items   -0.01   -0.01  -0.04   -0.04 
  (0.03)   (0.02)  (0.03)   (0.03) 
Investment   -0.04  0.00   -0.02  0.00 
   (0.03)  (0.03)   (0.03)  (0.03) 
Currently enrolled in school    -0.17 -0.16    -0.08 -0.09 
    (0.05)*** (0.07)**    (0.05)* (0.05)* 
N 1,240 1,093 1,240 1,239 1,092 1,049 1,034 1,049 1,049 1,034 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
Individual controls: age, male, baseline: enrolled, ever had sex, morbidity past 2 weeks, orphan 
Baseline controls: Head characteristics (female, age, age squared, ever attended school, chronic illness, married;) 
 Household characteristics (Baseline values of log per capita expenditure, household size, total age group categories,(0-5, 6-11, 12-17, 65+)) 
 
Discussion 
This study uses an unconditional cash transfer experiment to assess the effects of a positive income shock on adolescent mental health in 
beneficiary households. Our main findings indicate that a large-scale social cash transfer program may not have the capacity to reduce depression 
of all adolescents living in beneficiary households but may benefit some of the most disadvantaged groups, in this case, females and orphans who 
are generally at greater risks of mental disorders during adolescence. 
In our analysis, we use longitudinal data from adolescents ages 13-22 and examine the effect an unconditional cash transfer from Malawi’s 
SCTP has on mental health outcomes by comparing adolescents living in treatment households to those in control households. Results from our 
differences-in-differences analysis show that for the full sample of adolescents, the Malawi SCTP did not result in a significant reduction in the 
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likelihood of depression (CES-D score 10 or higher). Further heterogeneity analysis indicates that the 
program does, however, result in a significant 22-percentage point decline in depression amongst females 
and a 14-percentage point decline for orphans (Table 4.7). The impact for females is comparable to the 
decline in psychological distress experienced by adolescent girls receiving a randomized cash transfer in 
Zomba, Malawi (Baird et al., 2013). In contrast though, results from the Kenyan CT-OVC study were 
driven by the decline in male depression using the same CES-D instrument (Kilburn et al., 2015). On the 
other hand, that study did find stronger effects for orphans over non-orphans. The main advantage we 
have over these previous studies is a stronger identification strategy that uses longitudinal data and a DD 
specification to control for baseline mental health and unobserved trends across waves. Our results show 
that with single-differences, the SCTP significantly reduced depression by 10 percentage points for the 
full sample but this result overestimates the program impact if we account for baseline levels of 
depression.  
The second part of our analysis examined potential mediation channels in order to better explain 
how income increases could improve adolescent mental health. We find that the SCTP had strong impacts 
on a number of channels we proposed might explain the relationship between a cash transfer program and 
decreased mental health. Results show that treatment led to reductions in parental stress, increases in child 
investment spending and material well-being, and a large increase in school enrollment. Although the 
SCTP had large effects on these potential intervening channels, causal mediation analysis shows that 
these pathways do not mediate much of the direct path from the cash transfer to adolescent mental health. 
Nevertheless, school enrollment has an important protective effect and leads to a significant reduction in 
female depression (-17 pp) and orphan depression (-8 pp). The protective impact of schooling for 
adolescents is common finding in many cash transfer studies, especially for females as school enrollment 
contributes to delayed sexual debut (Handa et al., 2014), declines in early pregnancy (Handa et al., 2015; 
Baird et al., 2010), and even reduction in sexually transmitted disease (Baird et al., 2012).  
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Limitations 
There are a few limitations of our study that merit discussion. First, it is conceivable that 
adolescents in beneficiary households felt pressured to answer the CES-D questions more optimistically 
than did the control group with the implication that our self-reported mental health measures are biased. 
However, since we only found significant differences for particular subgroups, this would have be the 
case only for females and orphans. Summary results even show that in relation to baseline depression, 
males in beneficiary households were more likely to be depressed (Table 4.3 and 4.4).    
Second, there are inherent estimation challenges in identifying the pathways from income to child 
development outcomes (Strauss & Thomas, 2008; Shadish et al., 2002). For one, some of our constructs 
such as stress and investment are latent variables for the true underlying behaviors and are not externally 
manipulated meaning the model may lack some predictive power (Bullock & Ha, 2011). Additionally, 
since income from cash transfer programs is used to improve many aspects of beneficiaries’ lives at the 
same time, our study design is not ideal to identify causal mechanisms underlying the observed impacts. 
Nevertheless, the randomization of economic conditions, the use of longitudinal data, and the set of rich 
baseline covariates that we use to control for confounding, means that we can reasonably make causal 
predictions for whether these observed channels are mediating the cash transfer (Strauss & Thomas, 
2008).  
A final limitation of the present study is that the amount of time may have been too short for cash 
transfers to impact depression. While we do not find that tested pathways explain much of the treatment 
effect, the SCTP still has strong impacts on these channels that may over time continue to improve 
adolescent well-being including their mental health.  
Conclusion 
This paper provides new evidence from the Malawi Social Cash Transfer Program, a national 
unconditional cash transfer program in Africa, on the whether household-level income increases affect 
adolescent mental health. Given the combined public health and long-term developmental consequences 
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of mental health problems during adolescence, especially in low-income settings, policies should aim to 
better protect adolescent mental health. Overall, the results presented in this paper do not provide strong 
evidence that a positive income shock in the form of an unconditional cash transfer can improve 
adolescent mental health for all young people in beneficiary households, at least within a year’s time.  
Nevertheless, it does provide evidence the program had significant protective effects on certain vulnerable 
groups. Although improving adolescent mental health is not a specific objective of these types of cash 
transfer programs, if it can reach those most vulnerable to mental health disorders, these programs may 
have important public health ramifications. Therefore, policymakers should be aware of potential of 
heterogeneous program effects when designing interventions to reach adolescents. 
The results from this study contribute to emerging evidence on the influence of social cash 
transfer programs in SSA to promote adolescent development and safe transitions to adulthood by 
targeting household poverty. However, there is still more research needed to explain why these 
interventions affect adolescent development since pathways that we explore provide little evidence of 
mediation. Schooling appears to be the most promising pathway through which cash transfers may 
improve adolescent mental health and contribute to the successful transition to adulthood. Given the 
positive impacts that SCTs have had on female development outcomes including schooling, mental 
health, and sexual behaviors, it would be interesting to further investigate these inter-relationships to 
confirm causal pathways. Moreover, future researchers would be wise to consider the effects of social 
cash transfers over longer time frames both to assess if improvements in mental health occur after a 
longer time frame and to discover whether effects are sustained into adulthood.  
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APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL TABLES FROM CHAPTER 2 
 
Appendix Table A1. Summary of impacts in program objective areas  
Objective Area  All households  Poorest 50 percent of households  
Consumption, food security      
Consumption  ** ** 
Food consumption  ** ** 
Meals per day  ** ** 
Poverty  ** N/A 
Poverty gap   ** 
Squared poverty gap   ** 
Economic productivity   
Livestock  ** ** 
Crop production  ** ** 
Agricultural assets  ** ** 
Non-agricultural assets  ** ** 
Health, nutrition of young children  
 
** 
Weight-for-age  
 
** 
Weight-for-height  
 
 
Height-for-age  **  
3+ meals per day  
 
 
Illness  
 
 
Curative care  
 
 
Schooling, child work, material needs  ** ** 
Enrolment ages 6-13  ** ** 
Enrolment ages 14-17  ** ** 
Hours unpaid work  ** ** 
Hours paid work    
Material needs (blanket, clothes, shoes)    
Safe transition to adulthood  
(13-19-year-olds)   
** 
Sexual debut  ** ** 
Early pregnancy  
 
 
Mental health  
 
 
Health  ** ** 
Chronic illness  ** ** 
Morbidity  ** ** 
Curative care    
Caregiver Stress    
Source: Malawi Social Cash Transfer Program Midline Impact Evaluation Report (2015) 
(**) denotes statistically significant in the hypothesized  
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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL TABLES FROM CHAPTER 4 
 
Appendix Table B1. CES-D short form questions 
1. I was bothered by things that usually don't bother me. 
   
2. I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing  
   
3. I felt depressed.  
   
4. I felt that everything I did was an effort.  
   
5. I felt hopeful about the future.  
   
6. I felt fearful.  
   
7. My sleep was restless.  
   
8. I was happy.  
   
9. I felt lonely.  
   
10. I could not "get going."  
   
 
Appendix Table B2. Comparison of two adolescent panels: summary statistics at Wave 2 
 Adolescent panel, in 
household both waves 
Adolescent panel, interviewed 
both waves 
Age 16.4 (2.0) 16.4 (1.8) 
Male 53.2 53.1 
Enrolled 63.6 63.2 
Ever had sex 38.2 38.8 
Illness past 2 weeks 12.4 12.8 
Orphan 44.7 43.7 
CES-D10 score 19.6 (5.3) 19.8 (5.3) 
Depressed 49.3 48.6 
Observations 1958 1332 
 
Appendix Table B3: Impact of cash transfer using different CES-D thresholds to define depression 
 CES-D cutoff >=  
 8 9 10 11 12 
Treatment -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) 
N 2,638 2,638 2,638 2,638 2,638 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the VC level,  *p<0.1; ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
 
 
 
